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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two essays that study initial public offerings (IPO) earnings 
management. The first essay examines the underwriter’s certification and monitoring roles in 
IPO earnings management; the second essay explores the relation between IPO earnings 
management and post-IPO institutional ownership.
In the first essay, we investigate the certification role played by underwriters. We 
hypothesize that there is a negative relation between IPO earnings management and underwriter 
reputation and that there is a positive relation between underwriter reputation and firm operating 
performance. In addition, underwriters continue providing monitoring to the firms they take 
public. Using a sample of IPOs, we obtain results supporting our hypotheses. A weighted least 
squares regression confirms the robustness of our results.
In the second essay, we address two questions: (1) whether post-IPO institutional 
ownership is affected by pre-IPO earnings management; and (2) whether the presence of 
institutional ownership has an impact on stock return. We find that institutional investors are not 
likely to be deceived or misled by pre-IPO earnings management. Institutional investors seem to 
be able to identify IPO firms of higher quality and always seek IPO firms with lower 
discretionary accruals depending on post-IPO information, but the presence of institutional 
ownership itself has little impact on stock returns.
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INTRODUCTION
IPOs tend to be made by firms with limited operating histories in a primary offering. 
There is little public information about these firms available to outside investors at the time of 
the IPO other than that contained in their offering prospectuses. On the contrary, IPO issuers 
have inside information about their firms. Consequently, an information asymmetry exists 
between IPO issuers and potential outside investors. Since outside investors have to rely heavily 
on the IPO issuer’s disclosures, an incentive may arise for IPO issuers to manipulate reported 
earnings in order to increase their proceeds or achieve desired post-IPO ownership structure. 
Under the asymmetric information framework, this dissertation investigates IPO earnings 
management from two perspectives. One is the certification role of underwriters in IPO earnings 
management; another is the relation between IPO earnings management and post-IPO ownership 
structure.
The first essay aims to examine the certification role of underwriters in IPO earnings 
management. A stream of prior studies shows that IPO issuers employ opportunistic earnings 
management before issuing IPOs to obtain some gains, including enhancing initial firm values 
(e.g. Schipper 1989; Chaney and Lewis 1995; Ducharme et al. 2001). Another stream of 
researches reports the certification role of underwriters in different aspects such as issuing 
seasoned equity issues (e.g. Cooney et al. 2003; Jo, Kim, and Park 2007). However, the 
certification role played by underwriters in IPO earnings management has been largely 
overlooked. We hypothesize that there is a negative relation between IPO earnings management 
and underwriter reputation and that there is a positive relation between underwriter reputation 
and firm operating performance. In addition, we think that underwriters have strong incentives to
1
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continue providing monitoring to the firms they take public due to the lucrative business 
relationships. Using a sample of U.S. IPOs for the years 1996-2004, we obtain results supporting 
our hypotheses. A weighted least squares regression confirms the robustness of our results.
In the first essay, we find that IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters have 
less initial discretionary accruals and there is no significant relation between the discretionary 
accruals and initial firm value. We also find the post-issue operating performance of IPOs 
underwritten by high-reputation underwriters unaffected by initial discretionary accruals. For 
IPOs underwritten by low-reputation underwriters, the initial firm value and post-issue operating 
performance are both affected by the initial discretionary accruals of the issuers. We consider the 
possibility that IPO earnings management and the choice of underwriters are endogenously 
determined. Using an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression, we obtain 
consistent results. We find that the initial firm value and post-issue operating performance of 
IPO issuers are positively related to underwriter reputation. We also find that in the presence of 
effective certification and monitoring by underwriters, opportunistic earnings management is 
restrained.
The purpose of IPO issuers’ earnings management is not only to increase proceeds, but 
may be also to achieve a desired post-IPO ownership structure, especially a higher institutional 
ownership. In essay two, we attempt to explore the relation between pre-IPO earnings 
management and post-IPO ownership structure. Specifically, we address the following two 
questions: (1) whether post-IPO institutional ownership is affected by pre-IPO earnings 
management; and (2) whether the presence of institutional ownership has an impact on stock 
return.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For the first question, we find that post-IPO institutional ownership is not significantly 
related to pre-IPO earnings management. The reason is that institutional investors are smart and 
are not deceived or misled by pre-IPO earnings management. Moreover, institutional investors 
rely heavily on publicly available information rather than pre-IPO information to make their 
investment decisions. For the second question, we find that the presence of institutional 
ownership has little impact on post-IPO returns. The finding is also consistent with that of Field 
and Lowry (2005) that institutional investors can not predict future returns. Therefore, IPO 
issuers are unlikely to deceive institutional investors by manipulating pre-IPO earnings. 
Institutional investors seem to be able to identify IPO firms of higher quality and always seek 
IPO firms with lower discretionary accruals depending on post-IPO information, but the 
presence of institutional ownership itself has little impact on stock returns.
Our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, so far there is no 
published study that has specifically examined the underwriter’s certification role in IPO 
earnings management. Thus, this dissertation (essay one) is the first attempt to investigate the 
relation between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management. Second, we employ 
three alternative measures of post-IPO operating performance -  operating return on assets (ORA), 
operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA), and return on assets (ROA). This helps catch the 
change in post-IPO operating performance from different perspectives. Third, this dissertation 
(essay two) is also the first attempt to examine the relation between pre-IPO earning 
management and post-IPO ownership structure. In essay two, we discuss the possibility of 
manipulating pre-IPO earnings by IPO issuers to achieve a desired post-IPO institutional 
ownership through the IPO offer price. Finally, our research excludes the potential impact 
resulting from endogeneity.
3
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ESSAY 1:
THE CERTIFICATION ROLE OF UNDERWRITERS IN 
IPO EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
1.1. Introduction
The information asymmetries between IPO issuers and outside investors are considerable. 
Under this condition, IPO issuers may seek to increase their offering proceeds through 
manipulations of reportable earnings before going public. Prior studies have shown that pre-IPO 
aggressive earnings (accruals) management not only increases initial firm value, but also 
decreases subsequent return to investors. For example, Ducharme et al. (2001) find a positive 
relation between pre-IPO discretionary accruals and initial firm value. They also find a negative 
relation between initial discretionary accruals and subsequent firm performance. Similarly, Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998a) report a significant negative relation between discretionary accruals in 
the IPO offer year and stock returns over a three-year post-IPO period. Teoh, Wong, and Rao
(1998) find evidence that IPO firms, on average, have high positive issue-year earnings and 
discretionary accruals, followed by poor long-run earnings and negative discretionary accruals. 
Earlier studies by DuCharme (1994) and Friedlan (1994) also find that earnings reported by 
firms making stock offers contain on average abnormally high levels of accruals around the offer 
dates. According to Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), stock offer related 
abnormal accruals tend to reverse in later reporting periods.
An implication of prior research is that IPO firms on average have a tendency to adopt 
aggressive earnings management. According to this opportunism argument, entrepreneurs, 
venture capitalists, and managers have incentives to maximize issue proceeds, given the number 
of shares offered. However, prior studies on IPO earnings management have largely overlooked
4
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the certification role played by the underwriter. Ducharme et al. (2001) include both underwriter 
reputation and discretionary accruals as explanatory variables of IPO initial firm value, but the 
authors have not examined the relation between underwriter reputation and IPO accruals. Related 
studies on seasoned equity offerings have found evidence of a negative relation between auditor 
quality and earnings management (Zhou and Elders 2004), and an inverse relation between 
underwriter quality and issuers’ accruals (Jo, Kim, and Park 2007). As of today, no published 
study has specifically examined the effect of underwriter certification on IPO earnings 
management. Thus, an objective of this paper is to document the relation between underwriter 
reputation and IPO earnings management. We argue that the certification role played by IPO 
underwriters has a restraining effect on opportunistic earnings management by IPO issuers. In 
addition, we also examine a related issue that has not yet been studied in the literature, namely, 
the relation between underwriter reputation and post-issue operating performance of IPO firms 
given the presence of earnings management. We argue that underwriters have strong incentives 
to continue supplying monitoring to the firms they take public such that underwriter reputation is 
positively related to post-issue operating performance of IPO firms, even after the initial earnings 
management is taken into consideration.
We find empirical results consistent with our arguments. Using a sample of IPOs between 
1996 and 2004, our results show that IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters on 
average have discretionary accruals that are significantly less than those underwritten by 
medium- and low- reputation underwriters. Moreover, IPO discretionary accruals are not related 
to initial firm value when high-reputation underwriters are involved. For IPOs underwritten by 
low-reputation underwriters, there is a significant positive relation between IPO discretionary 
accruals and initial firm value. Our results further show that initial discretionary accruals are not
5
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related to post-issue operating performance for IPOs underwritten by high-reputation 
underwriters. On the other hand, initial discretionary accruals have a significant negative 
relation with post-issue operating performance for IPOs underwritten by low-reputation 
underwriters. We attribute this to the reversal of the aggressive initial discretionary accruals 
among IPOs associated with low-reputation underwriters. We further consider the possibility 
that IPO earnings management and the choice of underwriters are endogenously determined. 
Using an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression (IV-2SLS) approach, we obtain 
consistent results showing that opportunistic IPO earnings management is restrained by effective 
underwriter certification and that there is a positive relation between underwriter reputation and 
post-IPO operating performance even when IPO earnings management is taken into 
consideration. We consider the positive effect of underwriter reputation on post-issue firm 
performance an indication that the initial earnings management of IPO issuers does not make 
underwriters disinterested in the affairs of their clients. To prove that our conclusions are not 
driven by the larger number of observations in the high-reputation underwriter group, we also 
perform a weighted least squares regression and find that our results are robust.
1.2. Hypothesis development
1.2.1. Underwriter certification and earnings management
Investment bankers play many roles in the underwriting of security issues including 
production and certification of information, provision of interim capital, and/or supplying 
distribution and marketing skills. Certification requires the underwriters to bear the liability 
imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 for ensuring the fairness of the offer price. The role of 
underwriter certification in reducing information asymmetries and mitigating the adverse
6
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selection faced by outside investors has been extensively studied in the context of IPOs. In a 
typical model, in return for fees from the issuing firms, investment bankers produce and certify 
information about the firms that they underwrite. High-prestige investment bankers can have 
more stringent standards for certification of IPO firm value and can produce superior information 
about the firms that they underwrite. IPO issuers can signal favorable private information about 
their own values by choosing reputable underwriters. On the other hand, investors use an 
investment banker’s reputation to revise their estimates of issuing-firm value. Thus, high- 
reputation investment bankers will represent less risky and higher-quality IPOs, and the use of a 
high-reputation underwriter is a positive signal about IPO firm value. Since investment bankers 
are frequent participants in the equity market, they acquire reputation capital that enables them to 
act as credible certifiers of information. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) find that high-prestige 
investment bankers, with valuable reputation capital at risk and superior information regarding 
the issuing firm’s prospects, can credibly certify the value of the issues they underwrite. The 
certification role of the underwriter has been investigated more specifically in papers that have 
examined the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing. In general these 
studies argue that high-prestige underwriters are able to more fully price issues, reducing the 
level of underpricing. For example, Logue (1973), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and 
Trueman (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that IPOs 
managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. The 
empirical consensus is that IPO underwriters have performed their certification role in general, 
driven by the desire to protect their hard earned reputation capital.
Managers exercise some discretion in computing earnings without violating generally 
accepted accounting principles. It is possible that firms use discretionary accounting choices to
7
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manage earnings disclosures around the time of certain types of events. In view of the well- 
established correlation between earnings and share prices, earnings management activity seems 
particularly plausible around the time of unseasoned stock issues. According to this opportunism 
hypothesis, some firms opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before going public and 
investors are led to make overly optimistic expectations regarding future earnings of the issuers. 
Thus, issuing firms would be able to obtain a higher share price for their stock issue than they 
otherwise would. This view of IPO earnings management emphasizes the incentives that 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and managers have to maximize issue proceeds, given the 
number of shares offered.
A priori, the opportunistic earnings management of IPO issuers and the certification of 
underwriters appear at odd with each other. If high levels of abnormal accruals reflect deceptive 
accounting, we expect the related IPOs to be shunned by investment bankers that have 
significant reputation capital at stake.1 As a result, our first hypothesis is that there is a negative 
relation between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management. That is, when high- 
reputation underwriters are involved, IPO issuers become voluntarily or involuntarily less 
aggressive with earnings management. IPO issuers with minimal incentives for earnings 
management would select high-reputation underwriters to enhance underwriter certification, 
thereby signaling favorable information to outside investors. Our hypothesis is consistent with 
the implications of the results of Zhou and Elders (2004) and Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) on 
seasoned equity offerings. The negative relation between underwriter reputation and earnings 
management can also be inferred from the underwriter’s monitoring function. Block and Hoff
(1999) suggest that underwriters conduct due-diligence investigations to ensure proper 
information disclosure by issuers and prevent potential legal liabilities. High-reputation
8
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underwriters have more resources and more expertise and are therefore more likely to perform 
higher-quality monitoring in the underwriting process. Thus, high-reputation underwriters are 
less likely associated with aggressive IPO earnings management.
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relation between underwriter reputation and IPO 
earnings management.
1.2.2. Underwriter monitoring and post-IPO operating performance
The certification role of underwriters ends at the IPO, the monitoring function continues 
in the post-IPO period (Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and Jain and Kini (1999)). Prior studies 
suggest that investment bankers play a valuable monitoring function in ensuring that managers 
follow a value maximizing path. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that when a firm issues new 
securities, its activities are scrutinized by an investment banker or some similar intermediary 
acting as a monitor for the collective interests of investors of the new securities. Hansen and 
Torregrosa (1992) suggest that underwriter monitoring improves the issuing firm’s performance 
and reduces agency costs, thereby enhancing firm value. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue 
that given the active and continuing nature of the relationship between investment bankers and 
institutional investors, they work together in monitoring the affairs of IPO firms. More 
specifically, Jain and Kini (1999) find that underwriter monitoring is positively related to post- 
IPO operating and investment performance.
The relation between earnings management and IPO offer price has been examined in the 
literature. The effect of IPO earnings management on post-issue firm performance, given the 
certification and monitoring roles played by underwriters, has not yet been studied. Whether 
aggressive initial earnings management by IPO issuers deters or promotes underwriter
9
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monitoring in the post-issue period is not yet known empirically. We want to address the issue in 
this study also.
In general, when new securities are issued, issuing firms carefully examine the 
investment bankers’ track record in bringing past issues to the market as part of their lead 
underwriter selection process. Apart from factors such as pricing and marketing, issuers look to 
other performance areas such as post-issue price stability, market-making, analyst-coverage, and 
the ability to underwrite subsequent offerings or conclude corporate restructuring activities. 
Given the lucrative future opportunities, IPO underwriters have strong incentives to remain 
engaged in the affairs of the firms they take public and to ensure that managers are following 
value enhancing strategies. Thus, monitoring by underwriters has the potential to improve post- 
IPO operating performance. High-prestige underwriters, given their considerable resources, are 
more likely to supply long-term monitoring in order to continue the business relationships with 
their clients. Jain and Kini (1999) find that about 75% of lead underwriters assign at least one 
analyst to track the company they take public. In addition, the presence of institutional investors 
in the new issues market also promote underwriter monitoring. As implied in Stoughton and 
Zechner (1998), given the active and continuing nature of the relationship between investment 
bankers and institutional investors, high-prestige underwriters have strong incentives to work 
with the institutional investment community in monitoring the affairs of IPO issuers. Thus, we 
think IPO earnings management may make underwriters more cautious, but is unlikely to drive 
underwriters away from pursuing profitable relationships with the firms that they take public. 
The implication that we draw from the above discussion leads to our second hypothesis.
10
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Hypothesis 2: The reputation of the underwriter has a positive impact on the post-issue 
operating performance of IPO firms, even after the effect of earnings management is taken into 
consideration.
1.3. Sample and methodology
1.3.1. Sample selection
Our initial sample of IPOs is obtained from the IPO database of Hoovers Incorporated. 
The sample period is from April 1996 to December 2004. Several selection criteria are applied 
sequentially. The sample excludes financial institutions, utility firms, and ADRs. Also, the 
sample excludes firms with offer price less than one dollar and firms with offer size less than one 
million dollars. After matching with the Compustat data files, 367 IPOs have reported 
information on accruals and other necessary financial data for our analysis. Information 
regarding reputation of the IPO underwriters is based on the reputation rankings of Carter and 
Manaster (1990), and updated according to the information on the website of Jay Ritter. We 
further classify the underwriters into three groups. If an underwriter’s reputation rank is greater 
than or equal to 8.1, the underwriter is in the high-reputation group; if the reputation rank is 
between 5.1 and 7.1, the underwriter is in the medium-reputation group; and if the reputation 
rank is less than or equal to 5.0, the underwriter is in the low-reputation group. There are 191 
IPOs in the high-reputation group, 138 in the medium-reputation group, and 38 in the low- 
reputation group.
11
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1.3.2. Discretionary accruals
We use the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model to estimate nondiscretionary and 
discretionary accruals of each IPO firm.3 The cross-sectional method is used because a time 
series approach is not possible for IPOs. The cross-sectional approach has an additional 
advantage in that it incorporates changes in accruals resulting from changes in economic 
conditions for the industry as a whole. Since the cross-sectional regression is re-estimated each 
year, specific year changes in economic conditions affecting expected accruals are filtered out. 
Moreover, the common practice by underwriters of comparing market prices and financial 
information of similar firms when pricing IPO equity further shows the importance of extracting 
industry-wide economic conditions from abnormal accruals.
Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a), for each IPO firm, we find at least ten 
industry-matched firms with the same three-digit SIC code. If we were unable to find ten 
industry-matched firms with the same three-digit SIC code, we use industry-matched firms with 
the same two-digit SIC code. For each IPO firm j, we run the following regressions:
TAC„ ITA, = a ^ ll/T A ^ J  + aJ&REV^ I T A ^  + a^PPE ,, ITAlr_t] + e„ ----------(1.1)
Where
TACiy=total accruals (net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from
operations) in year y for the ith firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j. 
TAiy = total assets in year y for the ith firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j .
AREViy = change in revenues in year y for the ith firm in the industry group matched with 
offering firm j.
12
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PPEiy = gross property, plant, and equipment in year y for the ith firm in the industry group 
matched with offering firm j.
Then the following modifications of the Jones model suggested by Dechow et al. (1995) 
are used to estimate discretionary accruals (as fractions of lagged total assets):
NACjy = a0j [1 / TAjy_x ] + a„ [(AREVJy -  ARECjy) / TAJy_x ] + a2J [PPEJy I TAJy_x ]
DACJy = [TACJy / TAjy_x ] -  a0J [1 / TAJy_x ] -  aXJ [{AREVjy -  ARECjy ) / TAJy_x ]
- a 2j[PPEjy!TAjy_x]
Where
NACjy=nondiscretionary accruals for IPO firm j in year y.
DACjy = discretionary accruals for IPO firm j in year y.
ARECjy = change in accounts receivable for IPO firm j over year y.
[Insert Table 1.1 here]
Descriptive statistics for the estimated discretionary accruals are reported in Table 1.1. In 
Panel A of the table, we can see that between 1996 and 2004, eight of the nine median values of 
discretionary accruals in the high-reputation group are negative. For the medium-reputation 
group, six of the medians are negative. However, for the low-reputation group, only four are 
negative. An initial observation based on these numbers suggests that IPO issuers associated with 
medium- and low- reputation underwriters have aggressive earnings management. Panel B of 
Table 1.1 shows that in terms of event time, discretionary accruals of IPOs underwritten by high- 
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-1 and T=0, and they continue to be negative in the three years after the IPO. For IPOs 
underwritten by medium-reputation underwriters, the mean discretionary accruals in years T=-l 
and T=0 are positive and the median in year T=0 is also positive. While the mean and median 
values are negative in the post-IPO years, they are small and close to zero. For the low-reputation 
group, the mean discretionary accruals are all positive except in the year T=2. The median 
discretionary accruals are positive in event years between T=0 and T=2. In sum, the descriptive 
statistics suggest that IPO firms hiring medium- or low- reputation underwriters have higher 
levels of discretionary accruals than those hiring high-reputation underwriters in the pre-IPO and 
IPO offer years. This observation is consistent with those of Ducharme (1994) and Friedlan 
(1994) that there are abnormally high accruals around stock issue dates.
[Insert Table 1.2 here]
In Table 1.2, we report results testing the equality of means (medians) o f discretionary 
accruals across different reputation groups. The test results show that for the high-reputation 
underwriters, the median discretionary accruals are significantly lower than those of the medium- 
reputation underwriters in all the event years from T=-l to T=3. The same is true of those 
between the high- and low-reputation groups except year T=2. Between the medium- and low- 
reputation groups, the median discretionary accruals show a significant difference only in event 
year T=l. In short, discretionary accruals of IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters 
are significantly lower than those of other groups, whereas there is not much difference between 
those underwritten by medium- and low-reputation underwriters. The results are also consistent 
with the implication that either high-reputation underwriters have deliberately avoided IPO 
issuers with high pre-IPO discretionary accruals, or they tend to avoid each other (we address the 
endogeneity problem in Section 5 of this paper). The fact that the discretionary accruals of IPOs
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underwritten by high-reputation underwriters continue to be significantly less than those 
underwritten by median- and low- reputation underwriters in the post-IPO years suggests that 
high-reputation investment bankers have been careful in protecting their reputation capital both 
in short-run and long-run. This finding is consistent with the implications of Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1998) and Jain and Kini (1999) that underwriter reputation has a long-term significant 
impact on the operating and stock performance of IPOs. For now, it appears fair to say, based on 
the above results, IPO issuers hiring medium- or low- reputation underwriters are more likely to 
adopt aggressive earnings management policies than those hiring high- reputation underwriters.
1.4. Analysis and results
1.4.1. IPO earnings management and initial firm value
If aggressive earnings management of IPO issuers represents opportunistic behavior to 
maximize issue proceeds given the number of shares offered, then there should be a statistically 
significant positive relation between the accruals and initial firm value. However, this 
hypothetical correlation could be obscured by the presence of prestigious underwriters who are 
interested in protecting their reputation capital. We argue that underwriter reputation and IPO 
earnings management have a negative relation. The presence of high-prestige underwriters has a 
restraining impact on the aggressiveness of earnings management by IPO issuers due to the 
underwriter’s reputation capital at stake. In this section, we run regressions to empirically 
examine whether aggressive accruals management of IPO issuers is able to affect initial firm 
value given the certification role of the underwriter. Based on the lead underwriter’s reputation 
(high, medium, and low), the IPOs are divided into three groups and the following regression is 
performed on each group.
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FV, C + CxDACi(Jt_ ̂  + C2NACl(l_l} +C 3S'G/(M) + C40/*(M)
+ C5 ln(O S),+ C 6AGEi{(_l) + C 1SDl + ei  (1.4)
Where
FVi = initial firm value of IPO firm i (firm value = offer price times the number of 
shares outstanding after IPO).
DACl(t_X) = discretionary accruals of IPO firm i in the year before IPO.
NAC,(t_x) = nondiscretionary accruals of IPO firm i in the year before IPO.
SGi{t_i) = sales growth in the year before IPO.
OPj(t_x)= operating performance in the year before IPO.
\n(OS)j = the natural logarithm of the offer size.
AGEi(t_X) = age of the IPO firm in the year before IPO.
SDi = standard deviation of daily returns from day 6 to day 255 after IPO.
The regression model includes typical explanatory variables related to IPO initial 
performance. Offer size, age of firm, and standard deviation of daily returns are proxies 
representing asymmetry information. Sales growth is included to control for any value-relevant 
information prior to IPO. Unlike some other studies, we choose to exclude auditor-quality as an 
explanatory variable because of its high correlation with underwriter reputation. Balvers et al. 
(1988) find that high-reputation underwriters frequently use high-quality auditors in underwriting 
new issues. The explanatory variable, OPt-i, is sequentially set equal to operating return on assets 
(ORA), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA), and return on assets (ROA). Industry- 
adjusted measures of the just-mentioned three variables are also used in the regressions. To
16
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obtain industry-adjusted operating performance, we subtract from each firm’s raw operating 
performance the median of a group of firms with matched 3-digit SIC code. If there were 
insufficient firms (less than 10) in the industry, we use 2-digit SIC to find the matched 
companies.
[Insert Table 1.3 here]
Table 1.3 reports the regression results. For IPOs underwritten by high-reputation 
investment bankers, the coefficients of DAC are insignificant in all the regressions. That is, 
discretionary accruals of IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters do not increase 
initial firm value. For IPOs underwritten by medium-reputation investment bankers, the 
coefficients of DAC are also insignificant despite some coefficients of NDAC are significantly 
positive. For IPOs underwritten by low-reputation investment bankers, the coefficients of DAC 
and NDAC are significantly positive in all the regressions. The results show that underwriter 
reputation dampens the effect of IPO earnings management in affecting initial firm value. One 
interpretation of the results is that high-prestige underwriters are more capable than less 
prestigious underwriters in restraining the opportunistic earnings management of IPO issuers. 
However, it is also possible that aggressive IPO issuers deliberately avoid high-prestige 
underwriters.
1.4.2. Post-IPO operating performance and underwriter monitoring
All accruals ultimately reverse since accruals sum to zero within the life of the firm. If 
the IPO accruals are opportunistically managed, their reversal in subsequent periods may be so 
large as to dominate any new accruals, resulting in a net reversal of accruals and hence a decline 
in future earnings. As such, the opportunism argument could be confirmed if  post-IPO operating
17
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performance deteriorates precipitously among IPO issuers with aggressive earnings management. 
The three post-issue operating performance measures used for our investigation are operating 
return on assets (ORA), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA), and return on assets 
(ROA).
[Insert Table 1.4 here]
Table 1.4 reports the industry-adjusted yearly changes in post-issue operating 
performance of the IPO firms. The change in mean (median) performance is measured relative to 
the year before IPO. Continuous deterioration in post-IPO operating performance is consistent 
with the implication of opportunistic IPO earnings management. It could also imply a lack of 
underwriter monitoring in the post-issue period. The results in Table 1.4 show that for IPOs 
underwritten by high-reputation investment bankers, 6 of the 12 median values of the three 
operating performance measures over the period from years 0 to +3 have significant positive 
changes. For IPOs underwritten by medium-reputation underwriters, only two median values 
show significant positive improvement. For IPOs underwritten by low-reputation underwriters, 
none of the median values of the operating performance measures show significant positive 
change. Four of the median values have significantly negative changes. A quick observation 
based on the results in Table 1.4 is that underwriter reputation is positively related to post-IPO 
operating performance. This observation is consistent with the results of Jain and Kini (1999). 
These results are consistent with the effects of the reversal of IPO accruals associated with low- 
reputation underwriters and the value-enhancing monitoring provided by high-reputation 
investment bankers in the post-issue period.
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We perform the following regressions to further examine the effect of underwriter 
reputation on post-IPO firm performance given the presence of IPO earnings management. The 
regressions are performed on IPOs underwritten by the three groups of underwriters respectively.
AIMlj = C  + CxDACi{t_x) + C2NACi(t_x) + C,SG ,(M) + C4OPi(l_X)
+ C5 ln(OS), + C6AGEi{t.x) + C.SD, + e,.  (1.5)
AIM2, = C + CxDACi{l_X) + C 2NACi(M) + C3 SGi{l_x) + CAOPi{t_x)
+ C5 In (O Sl + C6 AG£i(l_X) + C7 SD, + e, -----(1.6 )
AIMS i — C + CXDAC + C2NACl(l_X) + C 35'G|(M) + C 4OP t̂_x̂
+ C5 In (OS), + C6AGEi(l_X) + C.SD, + e,  (1.7)
where
AIM1 = average industry-adjusted operating return on assets between years T=1 and T=3.
AIM2 = average industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets between years T=1 and T=3.
AIM3 = average industry-adjusted return on assets between years T=1 and T=3.
OP = industry-adjusted operating performance in year T=-l.
The dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted operating performance measure 
in the three-year post-IPO period. Using average performance over three years rather than annual 
performance can smooth out temporal fluctuations due to distortions arising from accrual 
accounting by the IPO firm
In Table 1.5a, we report regression results for IPOs underwritten by high-reputation 
underwriters. For all the three industry-adjusted operating performance measures (AIM1 to 
AIM3), the coefficients of DAC are insignificant in all the regressions. The same is found in
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Table 1.5b for IPOs underwritten by medium-reputation underwriters. For IPOs underwritten by 
low-reputation underwriters, results in Table 1.5 c show more than half (six out of nine) of the 
coefficients of DAC are significantly negative. In Table 1.5c, the coefficients of DAC are not 
significant when operating performance measure AIM2 is used. In short, for IPOs underwritten 
by low-reputation underwriters, initial earnings management has a significant negative impact on 
post-IPO operating performance. This result is consistent with the effect of the reversal of IPO 
accruals on subsequent firm operating performance among issuers using low-reputation 
underwriters. The result in Table 1.5a is also consistent with the implication that high-reputation 
underwriters are not disheartened by the initial earnings management of the firms that they take 
public. The monitoring that high-reputation underwriters continue to supply improves the post­
issue operating performance of their clients. In other words, underwriter reputation has a 
positive impact on post-IPO operating performance despite the presence of IPO earnings 
management. 4
[Insert Tables 1.5a, 1.5b, and 1.5 c here]
1.5. Robustness tests
1.5.1. The endogeneity between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management
IPO earnings management and the choice of the lead underwriter could be mutually 
related. IPO issuers with aggressive earnings management may deliberately avoid high-prestige 
underwriters if they think the underwriters would monitor their accruals management. Likewise, 
high-prestige underwriters may also choose to avoid IPO issuers with aggressive earnings 
management given their reputation capital at stake. To handle this possible endogeneity problem, 
we use an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression (IV-2SLS) approach. For the
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underwriter reputation, we use an estimated reputation (ER) instead of the actual reputation 
ranking. Using all the IPOs (including financials, utilities, and ADRs) over our sample period, 
we perform the following regressions initially. 5
AR-i = C +  CxDACl{l_X) + C2Ln(TAi{l_l)) + C3(LnTAi(t_l)) 2 + e, -------(1.9)
ARj — C + CxDACt(t_ + C2Ln(TAi{t_X)) + C3(LnTAt̂ _ )̂ + Ci SDj
+ e,  (1.10)
AR, = C + C xDACl{t_X) + C2 Ln(TAi(t_x)) + C3 (LnTAl(l_X) ) 2 +C<SDt
+ G5AGEKl_x)+e,  (1.11)
In the above models, AR is the actual reputation ranking of the underwriter per Carter 
and Manaster (1990). The regression coefficients from each model are then applied to our IPO 
sample to find the estimated reputation, ER, of each underwriter. We estimate ER using three 
different methods in order to address the possibility of getting a weak instrumental variable. We 
then perform the following regressions, using the three alternative estimates of ER.
FVi — C + CXDAC ;(M) + C2iS'Gj(M) +C 3Oi*(M)
+ C4 \n{TAl_x)l + C 5AGEt{f_X) +C6SD, +C.ER, +e,  (1.12)
AIM i — C + CxDACi(l_X) + C25,G,(,_1) + C3OPlXl_Xy
+ C4 1 n(TA,_x) i + C5AGEi(t_x) + C 6SD, + C 1ERi +e,  (1.13)
Where AIM is sequentially set equal to AIM1, AIM2, and AIM3; we also perform the
two regressions with different formats in which we leave out some o f the independent variables.
21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
[Insert Table 1. 6  here]
Table 1.6 presents the regression results of model (1.9), (1.10), and (1.11). The regression 
coefficients from each model are applied to our IPO sample to find the estimated reputation, ER, 
of each underwriter. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C in Table 1.6 report the regression results for 
the models (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) respectively. In Panel A, the regression coefficients are in 
turn 6.0624, -0.0239, 0.7824 and -0.0525. The p-values are 0.0000, 0.1532, 0.0000 and 0.0001 
respectively. R-square is 0.16. We then use the regression coefficients obtained from the model 
(1.9) to compute the estimated reputation for each underwriter. In Panel B, we add the standard 
deviation on the right side of the model (1.9) to get the model (1.10). The regression coefficients 
are in turn 6.2000, -0.0242, 0.7467, -0.0503 and -0.1743. The p-values are 0.0000, 0.1360, 
0.0000, 0.0001 and 0.0000 respectively. R-square is 0.21. Similarly, we apply the regression 
coefficients obtained from the model (1 .1 0 ) to compute the estimated reputation for each 
underwriter. Finally, we add one more independent variable, the age of IPO firm, to obtain the 
model (1.11). The regression coefficients are 6.4208, -0.0226, 0.6663, -0.0373, -0.1712 and - 
0.0097. The p-values are 0.0000, 0.1584, 0.0000, 0.0047, 0.0000 and 0.0022 respectively. R- 
square is still 0.21. Again, we compute the estimated reputation based on the regression 
coefficients obtained from the model ( 1 .1 1 ).
[Insert Table 1.7 here]
Table 1.7 reports the regression results when ER is estimated using model (1.9). The 
results in Panel A show that the coefficients of DAC are insignificant in all the regressions. That 
is, with the endogeneity between IPO earnings management and the choice of the underwriter 
considered, pre-IPO accruals do not affect the initial value of IPO firms. In addition, the results 
in Panel A also show that all the coefficients of ER are significantly positive. That is, with the
22
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
endogeneity problem considered, certification of high-reputation underwriters add to firm value. 
The result implies that in the presence of effective certification by the underwriter, opportunistic 
initial earnings management of IPO issuers is ineffective in affecting the initial firm value. 
Specifically, the certification role played by high-prestige underwriters restrains opportunistic 
earnings management of IPO firms. The finding lends support to our first hypothesis. The next 
three panels of Table 1.7 report results related to the post-issue operating performance of IPO 
issuers. Similar to the results in Panel A, coefficients of DAC are all insignificant in Panels B, C, 
and D. At the same time, all the coefficients of ER are significantly positive. The significantly 
positive relation between underwriter reputation and post-IPO operating performance implies 
that underwriters are not disheartened by the initial earnings management of IPO issuers. IPO 
underwriters keep themselves engaged in the affairs of their clients because of the lucrative 
business relationships. The monitoring that high-reputation underwriters continue to supply to 
the firms they take public is value-increasing. This finding supports our second hypothesis and is 
consistent with Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and Jain and Kini (1999).
[Insert Tables 1.8 and 1.9 here]
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 report regression results when the instrumental variable, ER, is 
estimated using models (1.10) and (1.11) respectively. The results on the initial firm value of 
IPO issuers are very similar and consistent with those reported in Table 1.7. That is, IPO 
discretionary accruals management is unrelated to initial firm value when the endogeneity 
between earnings management and the choice of underwriters is considered. Regarding the 
regression results on post-IPO operating performance, the coefficients of DAC continue to be 
insignificant. However, the coefficients of ER in panels B, C, and D of Tables 1. 8  and 1.9 are 
mostly significant only at the 10% level, with some of them insignificant. We think the weaker
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results are likely related to our estimation of the instrumental variable used in these two tables. 
Specifically, we find that adding independent variables in estimating the instrumental variable 
ER has not increased the R-square of the estimation. Hence, the instrumental variable ER in 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 could be weaker than that in Table 1.7. Nevertheless, results in Tables 1.8 and 
1.9 are still consistent with those in Table 1.7.
1.5.2 Weighted least squares regression
In our sample, the high- and medium- reputation underwriter groups have observations 
several times that of the low-reputation underwriters. To avoid our results being driven by this 
factor, we apply a weighted least squares approach to the instrumental variable two-stage 
regression model. The weight applied to each observation is equal to the inverse of the number 
of observations in each underwriter-reputation group. In this manner, each group receives equal 
weight in the estimation.
[Insert Table 1.10 here]
From the results in Table 1.10, we again find the initial firm value and post-IPO 
operating performance of IPO issuers positively related to underwriter reputation. Also, the 
coefficients of DAC are insignificant in all the regressions. That is, the presence of effective 
certification and monitoring by underwriters has restrained the opportunistic initial earnings 
management by IPO issuers. The results are identical to those in Tables 1.7 to 1.9. In sum, the 
additional tests in section 5 prove that our empirical results are robust.
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1.6. Summary
Prior studies document that there is a positive relation between IPO earnings management 
and the initial value of the IPO firm. They attribute this to the opportunistic earnings 
management of IPO issuers. However, the certification role played by underwriters has been 
largely overlooked in prior studies. In this study, we argue that underwriters have incentives to 
protect their reputation capital and therefore there is a negative relation between IPO earnings 
management and underwriter reputation. In addition, based on existing literature that examines 
the monitoring role performed by underwriters, we further argue that high-prestige underwriters 
have strong incentives to continue supplying monitoring to the firms that they take public due to 
the lucrative business relationships. Thus, we hypothesize that there is a positive relation 
between underwriter reputation and firm operating performance even when initial earnings 
management is taken into consideration.
Our results show that IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters on average have 
discretionary accruals that are significantly less than those associated with medium- and low- 
reputation underwriters. Moreover, IPO discretionary accruals are not related to initial firm value 
when high-reputation underwriters are involved. For IPOs underwritten by low-reputation 
underwriters, there is a significant positive relation between IPO discretionary accruals and 
initial firm value. We argue that this is consistent with implications of opportunistic earnings 
management among IPOs using low-reputation underwriters.
Regarding post-IPO operating performance, our results show that IPOs underwritten by 
high-reputation underwriters experience improvements in various raw and industry-adjusted 
performance measures. On the other hand, IPOs underwritten by low-reputation underwriters 
experience declining operating performance in the three years after going public. Our regression
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results further show that IPO discretionary accruals are not related to post-issue operating 
performance for IPOs underwritten by high-reputation underwriters. On the other hand, initial 
discretionary accruals have a significant negative relation with post-issue operating performance 
for IPOs underwritten by low-reputation underwriters. We attribute this to the reversal of the 
aggressive initial accruals among IPOs associated with low-reputation underwriters.
For robustness tests, we consider the possibility that IPO earnings management and the 
choice of the underwriter are endogenously determined. Using an instrumental variable two- 
stage least squares regression (IV-2SLS) approach, we obtain consistent results that IPO earnings 
management is restrained by effective underwriter certification and that there is also a positive 
relation between underwriter reputation and post-IPO operating performance even when IPO 
earnings management is taken into consideration. We consider the positive effect of underwriter 
reputation on post-issue firm performance an indication that the initial earnings management of 
IPO issuers does not make underwriters disinterested in the affairs of their clients. We also 
control for the unequal number of IPOs underwritten by each reputation-group by performing a 
weighted least squares regression. We obtain similar results.
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ESSAY 2:
PRE-IPO EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND 
POST-IPO OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of IPO issuers’ earnings management is not only to increase proceeds, but 
may be also to achieve a desired post-IPO ownership structure, especially a higher institutional 
ownership. In essay two, we explore the relation between pre-IPO earnings management and 
post-IPO ownership structure. Specifically, we address the following two questions: (1) whether 
pre-IPO earnings management or conventional variables related to IPO firm characteristics such 
as total assets play a more important role in affecting post-IPO institutional ownership; and (2) 
whether the presence of post-IPO institutional ownership or other more essential factors related 
to IPO firm characteristics such as IPO accruals quality play a more significant role in affecting 
post-IPO stock returns.
Fernando et al. (2004) find that post-IPO institutional ownership increases monotonically 
with the chosen IPO price level and that IPO firms use offer price to generate desired post-IPO 
ownership structures. Kim and Park (2005) find that equity issuers employ aggressive accounting 
decisions to push up their offer prices. Thus, if IPO issuers want to achieve a desired post-IPO 
ownership structure, aggressive earnings management may be taken to push up the offer price to 
attract institutional investors. To testify our ratiocination and answer the first question, we 
examine the association between pre-IPO earnings management and post-IPO ownership 
structure to see whether IPO issuers can use pre-IPO earnings management as an effective tool to 
achieve a desired post-IPO ownership structure.
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Several studies show that stock returns and institutional ownership are positively related. 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional 
ownership and returns measured over the same period. Dennis and Strickland (2002) find that a 
firm’s abnormal return is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. 
Fernando et al. (2004) also report that IPO firms choosing a more institutional investor base 
experience lower mortality rates. In addition, there are several other advantages related to 
institutional ownership. For example, Clyde (1997) shows that the institutional ownership is 
positively related to the benefits of policing firms. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) also suggest 
that institutional investors may provide the monitoring function after IPO. Baysinger et al. (1991) 
even find that the institutional ownership has positive impact on corporate R&D spending. 
Moreoever, higher institutional ownership can avoid higher transaction cost imposed by 
individual investors (Mclnish and Wood 1992). Hence, to obtain one or more benefits related to 
institutional investments, IPO issuers may adopt aggressive earnings management to push up 
IPO offer price and stock returns to attract more institutional investors. However, Field and 
Lowry (2005) indicate that institutional investors can not predict future returns. To explain the 
puzzle and shed light on our second question, we investigate the relation between post-IPO 
institutional ownership and stock returns.
To further explore if initial institutional ownerships are affected by the IPO firm’s motive 
of going public other than the initial earnings management, we conduct robustness checks to see 
if IPO institutional ownerships during the first year following the IPO issue date are explainable 
by some of the more commonly cited hypotheses of IPO offerings: (1) signaling of future 
opportunities; (2) market-timing hypothesis; (3) asymmetric information. We regress IPO 
institutional ownerships on proxy variables underlying the three hypotheses. For the signaling of
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future opportunities hypothesis, we use the average return on assets during the first and second 
year following IPO issue date to proxy the future opportunities. If the signaling hypothesis is true, 
the coefficient on ROA will be significantly positive. For the market-timing hypothesis, we use 
excess return during the 2-year period following IPO issue date as a proxy. If the motive of IPO 
issuers is due to market-timing, the coefficient on excess return will be significantly positive. 
Finally, we use the standard deviation of stock returns from day 5 to day 225 following the IPO 
issue date to proxy asymmetric information. The coefficient on the standard deviation will be 
significantly negative if the asymmetric information hypothesis is true.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 defines the institutional 
ownership and describes the sample. Section 2.3 develops the hypotheses and presents empirical 
results. Robustness tests are conducted in section 2.4. Section 2.5 further explores the motives of 
IPO issuers. Concluding remarks are made in section 2.6.
2.2. Definition of Institutional Ownership and Data Description
2.2.1. Definition of Institutional Ownership
To investigate the above questions, at first we need to define institutional ownership. We 
have three definitions for institutional ownership: ( 1 ) the number of institutional owners; (2 ) the 
percentage of shares owned by all institutional investors; and (3) the average percentage of 
shares owned by each institution. The third definition (average percentage of shares owned by 
each institution) is equal to the second definition (the percentage of shares owned by all 
institutions) divided by the first definition (the number of institutional owners). The third 
definition of institutional ownership is also a measure of concentration of ownership adopted by 
Hedge et al (2003).
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In this essay, we focus on the first and the second definitions of institutional ownership, 
that is, the number of institutional owners and the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. 
Because some institutional investors have restrictions investing in IPOs, the third definition of 
institutional ownership may be distorted by the upper limit of shares that an institutional investor 
can buy or hold. Thus, focusing on the first and the second definitions of institutional ownership 
is more realistic and meaningful.
2.2.2. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Our data are the IPO firms reported on the website: www.Hoovers.com. The institutional 
ownership data are obtained from the 13F filings reported in the database of Thomson One 
Banker. Our sample period covers from April 1996 to December 2004. Several selection criteria 
are applied sequentially. The sample excludes financial institutions, utility firms, and ADRs. 
This avoids some potentially confounding factors such as the capital structure of financial 
institutions, systematic effects of regulations, etc. Also, the sample excludes firms with offer 
price less than one dollar and firms with offer size less than one million dollars, because in these 
cases firms are not required to disclose all of the data that are needed to calculate earnings 
management measures. In addition, unit offerings are eliminated since a unit consists of at least 
one common share plus warrants or debentures and one cannot directly observe the initial equity 
value alone for unit offerings. For the final sample, we have 338 IPO firms with institutional 
ownership data from April 1996 through December 2004.
[Insert Table 2.1 Here]
Table 2.1 presents the data description of the institutional ownership of IPO firms. Panel 
A in the table presents the data description if the institutional ownership is defined as the number
30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of institutional owners. Panel B in the table presents the data description if the institutional 
ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. Panel A shows that 
the means (medians) of the number of institutional owners are 31.9 (29), 34.05 (28), 40.34 (31), 
45.23 (35), 56.24 (40.5) and 63.50 (46) respectively at the end of the first, second, third, fourth 
quarter, the second and third year after the IPO offering date. Panel B shows that the means 
(medians) of the percentage of shares owned by all institutions are 0.24 (0.20), 0.26 (0.22), 0.29 
(0.26), 0.31 (0.28), 0.36 (0.31) and 0.40 (0.36) respectively at the end of each post-IPO time 
period. From the data description, we find that the means of the number of institutional owners, 
the means and medians of the percentage of shares owned by all institutions all increase over 
time. Most of the medians of the number of institutional owners also increase over time except 
the one at the end of the second quarter after IPO. The findings indicate that more institutional 
investors would like to invest when more public information on the firms are available over time.
Next, we check the offer prices of IPOs with different institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals. We assign an IPO into the high-, medium-, or low-discretionary accruals 
group if the size of accruals is within the top, middle, or bottom one-third discretionary accruals. 
The means (medians) of offer prices for IPO firms with different post-IPO institutional 
ownership and pre-IPO discretionary accruals are presented in Table 2.2.
[Insert Table 2.2 Here]
From Panel A of Table 2.2, we find that for all the three discretionary accruals groups, 
higher offer prices are related to higher institutional ownership - the number of institutional 
owners. The median offer prices are 18.00, 15.00 and 10.00 respectively for the high, medium 
and low institutional ownership groups if discretionary accruals are high. The median offer 
prices are 17.00, 14.00 and 10.00 respectively if discretionary accruals are medium. The median
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offer prices are 17.00, 14.00 and 9.00 respectively if discretionary accruals are low. Therefore, 
for all level discretionary accruals groups, higher offer prices are related to higher institutional 
ownership. On the other hand, for the three levels of institutional ownerships, higher offer prices 
are also positively related to higher discretionary accruals. For the high institutional ownership 
group, the medians of offer prices are 18.00, 17.00 and 17.00 respectively for high, medium and 
low discretionary accruals groups. For the medium institutional ownership group, the medians of 
offer prices are 15.00, 14.00 and 14.00 respectively. For the low institutional ownership group, 
the medians of offer prices are 10.00, 10.00 and 9.00 respectively. In Panel B of Table 2.2, we 
find that only for the high and low discretionary accruals groups, higher offer prices are related 
to higher institutional ownership -  the percentage of shares owned by all institutions.
The descriptive statistics above show that in most cases higher post-IPO institutional 
ownership is related to higher IPO offer price and that higher IPO offer price is accordingly 
related to higher pre-IPO discretionary accruals, especially when the institutional ownership is 
defined as the number of institutional investors. Therefore, IPO issuers may manipulate pre-IPO 
earnings to push up offer price and attract institutional investors. To further testify our conjecture, 
we develop two hypotheses and report the empirical results in next section.
2.3. Hypothesis development and empirical results
2.3.1. Hypothesis 1
Our first concern is whether pre-IPO earnings management or conventional variables 
related to IPO firm characteristics such as total assets play a more important role in affecting 
post-IPO institutional ownership. The conventional variables include the size of IPO firms 
measured by total assets, the age of IPO firms, the reputation ranking of underwriters, the
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leverage ratio and so on. If pre-IPO earnings management plays a more significant role in 
affecting post-IPO institutional ownership, IPO firms may adopt this effective method to attract 
institutional investors and obtain some benefits related to institutional ownership. There are 
several benefits related to institutional investments. For example, institutional investors may 
provide the monitoring function in the future (Clyde 1997; Stoughton and Zechner 1998). With 
more institutional investments, IPO firms experience lower mortality rates (Fernando et al. 2004). 
Also, IPO firms with more institutional investors can avoid higher transaction cost imposed by 
individual investors (Mclnish and Wood 1992). However, we do not expect that there is a 
significant association between pre-IPO earnings management and post-IPO institutional 
ownership. Field and Lowry (2005) find that institutional investors depend heavily on publicly 
available information to make their investment decisions. In other words, institutional investors 
rely heavily on post-IPO information rather than pre-IPO information to make their investment 
decisions. Thus, we wonder how important pre-IPO earnings management could be in affecting 
post-IPO institutional ownership. With the reason above considered, our first hypothesis is 
developed as follows:
Hypothesis 1: pre-IPO earnings management has a very little impact on post-IPO 
institutional ownership, while conventional variables related to IPO firm  characteristics still 
play a significant role in affecting post-IPO institutional ownership.
To explore the relation between post-IPO institutional ownership and pre-IPO earnings 
management, we use simultaneous estimation equations given that the choice of the level of the 
pre-IPO accruals and the size of the post-IPO institutional ownership could be simultaneously
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determined. If we ignore the simultaneity among variables in this case, the results could be 
biased and inconsistent.
The dependent variable of the first equation is pre-IPO discretionary accruals, which is 
used to measure pre-IPO earnings management. The independent variables include the 
institutional ownership in the IPO issue year, which is used to proxy post-IPO institutional 
ownership. To reduce the possibility of model misspecification due to missing variables, we 
follow prior studies to control for additional independent variables in the model. Numerous 
studies have documented that unexpected accruals are negatively related to firm operating 
performance (Dechow 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). We thus include pre-IPO firm 
operating performance as one of the explanatory variables, which is measured by operating 
return on assets (ORA), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA), or return on assets (ROA) 
alternatively. Previous research also suggests that firms of larger size are less likely to 
manipulate earnings because they are more attention-getting in the market and are more likely to 
be detected and monitored (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981). Field 
and Lowry (2005) also find that the institutional presence in firms of different sizes is 
significantly different. Therefore, we include the natural log of pre-IPO total assets and the 
natural log of IPO offer size to control for the firm size effect. In addition, growth in sales and 
age prior to IPO are included to control for any value-relevant information it may provide at the 
time of IPO. Furthermore, we set industry dummy variables (SIC) to control for the effect 
resulting from different industries. Finally, considering the mutual association between 
discretionary accruals and underwriter’s reputation, we include underwriter’s reputation in the 
equation. Here we still use the Jay Ritter’s revision of underwriter’s reputation rankings, which is 
based on Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) rankings. In all, the
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independent variables include the post-IPO institutional ownership, the pre-IPO firm operating 
performance, the natural log of pre-IPO total assets, the natural log of IPO offer size, sales 
growth, age, underwriter’s reputation rank, and SIC dummy variables.
In the second equation, the dependent variable is the institutional ownership in the IPO 
issue year. The independent variables include pre-IPO discretionary accruals and other 
controlling parameters such as pre-IPO firm operating performance, the natural log of pre-IPO 
total assets, sales growth, age, underwriter’s reputation rank, the industry dummy variables, and 
the leverage ratio (long-term debt over total assets) in the IPO issue year. We use the leverage 
ratio to proxy the closeness to a debt-covenants violation, because firms are more likely to 
manipulate earnings when they are close to violating debt covenants. For the reasons mentioned 
above, we only apply the first and the second definitions of institutional ownership respectively 
in the following simultaneous equations:
DAC-i — C + C 1IH0 + C2 OP-i + C3 Ln(TA_i) + C4 Ln(OS) + C5 SG-i + C<jAGE-i 
+ C7RANK + CgSIC + e  (2.1)
IH0 = C + C 1DAC.1 + C2 OP.! + C3 Ln(TA-i) + C4 SG.1 + C5AGE-1 + C6RANK
+ C7LEV0 + C8SIC + e  (2.2)
Where
DAC-i is the discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year;
Cj are coefficients, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7 or 8 ;
IHo is the institutional ownership one-year after IPO issue date;
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OP-i is the operating performance in the pre-IPO year, which is measured by operating return on 
assets (ORA), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA), or return on assets (ROA) 
alternatively;
TA-i is the total assets of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year;
OS is the offer size of IPO firms;
SG-i is the sales growth in the pre-IPO year;
AGE-i is the age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year;
RANK is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter;
LEVo is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt/total assets) in the IPO issue year;
SIC is a series of dummy variables for IPO firms’ standard industrial classification code; 
e is the regression disturbance, assumed cross-sectionally uncorrelated and normally distributed 
with mean zero.
[Insert Table 2.3 Here]
Table 2.3 reports the regression results of simultaneous equations (2.1) and (2.2). In 
Table 2.3, the institutional ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners, that is, the 
first definition of institutional ownership. Results for equation (2.1) are shown in Pane A of 
Table 2.3, and results for equation (2.2) are shown in Pane B. From Panel A, we do not find any 
significant relation between pre-IPO discretionary accruals and institutional ownership in the 
IPO issue year. The coefficients of institutional ownership are -0.0002, -0.0001, 0.0002, -0.0002, 
-0.0001, 0.0003 respectively for the six regressions with different operating performance 
measures. We have similar findings in Panel B. When the dependent variable is institutional 
ownership, all the coefficients of pre-IPO discretionary accruals are insignificant. The results in 
the Panel A and B of Table 2.3 indicate that there is no significant relation between pre-IPO
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discretionary accruals and institutional ownership in the IPO issue year. In other words, pre-IPO 
earning management can not affect post-IPO institutional ownership. The results imply that 
institutional investors are not easily deceived or misled by pre-IPO earnings management. One 
possible reason is that institutional investors have more reliable information than individual 
investors and institutional investors are able to see through any misinformation associated with 
IPO issuers’ earnings management. This is consistent with the findings of Field and Lowry (2005) 
that institutional investors are on average smart investors.
Although we do not find a significant relation between IPO accruals and the initial 
institutional ownership, most of conventional parameters are still significant. From Panel B of 
Table 2.3, we find significant relations between institutional ownership in the IPO issue year and 
conventional parameters such as total assets, age, underwriter’s reputation rank and the leverage 
ratio (long-term debt over total assets). All the coefficients of these four conventional parameters 
are significant at the 5% level. Among the conventional parameters, total assets and 
underwriter’s reputation rank are positively related to institutional ownership in the IPO issue 
year. Age and the leverage ratio are negatively related to institutional ownership in the IPO issue 
year. That is, institutional investors prefer to choose IPOs with larger size (total assets) and 
higher reputation underwriter, and try to avoid IPOs with higher leverage ratio (long-term debt 
over total assets) and longer history. The results show that institutional investors make their 
decisions still based on conventional parameters and their decisions are not affected by IPO 
issuers’ earnings management.
[Insert Table 2.4 Here]
Next, we use the second definition of institutional ownership (the percentage of shares 
owned by all institutions) instead of the first definitions of institutional ownership (the number of
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institutional owners) to run the above simultaneous estimation equations (2 .1 ) and (2 .2 ) again. 
The regression results are presented in Table 2.4 and are very similar to the earlier results when 
institutional ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. In Table 2.4, the 
institutional ownership in the IPO issue year is still not related to pre-IPO earnings management. 
In Panel A, all the coefficients on the institutional ownership are not significant when the 
dependent variable is the pre-IPO discretionary accruals. At the same time, all the coefficients on 
the pre-IPO discretionary accruals are not significant in Panel B when the dependent variable is 
the institutional ownership. However, although conventional parameters still have the same signs, 
only the coefficients of total assets are significant. All the coefficients on the natural log of total 
assets are significant at the 5% level in Panel B. The results imply that among the conventional 
variables, total asset is a very powerful explanatory parameter. For untabulated robustness tests, 
we use total accruals instead of discretionary accruals to run all the above regressions again and 
have similar results.
Hence, the regression results of simultaneous equations above support our first 
hypothesis. That is, pre-IPO earnings management has a very little impact on post-IPO 
institutional ownership, while conventional variables related to IPO firm characteristics still play 
a significant role in affecting post-IPO institutional ownership. The results indicate that IPO 
issuers are not likely to change post-IPO institutional ownership by pre-IPO earnings 
management. The results also imply that institutional investors are smart and are not deceived or 
misled by pre-IPO earnings management. Moreover, according to Field and Lowry (2005), 
institutional investors rely heavily on publicly available information rather than pre-IPO 
information to make their investment decisions. Therefore, pre-IPO earnings management plays 
a very limited role in affecting post-IPO institutional ownership.
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2.3.2. Hypothesis 2
Our second question is whether the presence of institutional ownership or other more 
essential factors related to IPO firm characteristics such as IPO accruals quality play a more 
significant role in affecting post-IPO stock returns. We investigate whether the presence of 
institutional ownership or other factors related to IPO firm characteristics are more important or 
essential in affecting post-IPO stock returns. Numerous studies examine the relation between 
institutional ownership and stock returns. Michaely et al. (1994) and Badrinath et al. (1995) 
indicate that higher institutional ownership is related to higher post-IPO stock returns. Nofsinger 
and Sias (1999) document a strong positive correlation between changes in institutional 
ownership and returns measured over the same period. Dennis and Strickland (2002) also find 
that a firm’s abnormal return is positively related to the percentage of institutional ownership. 
However, in this paper we are mostly interested in exploring the underlying reason behind the 
explicit relation between institutional ownership and stock returns. Because Field and Lowry 
(2005) find that institutional investors can not predict future returns, we wonder if there are any 
other more important factors such as IPO accruals quality to determine the explicit relation 
between institutional ownership and stock returns. Thus, we have the second hypothesis as 
follows:
Hypothesis 2: post-IPO stock return is not directly related to the presence o f  post-IPO 
institutional ownership, but is determined by other more essential factors related to IPO firm  
characteristics such as IPO accruals quality.
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To determine this, we examine whether there is any significant relation between post-IPO 
one-year buy-and-hold stock returns and institutional ownership in IPO issue year. At the same 
time, we take into consideration other valuable factors such as IPO discretionary accruals and the 
book-to-market ratio. We use the one-year time period because the association between post-IPO 
stock returns and institutional ownership may be contaminated by other factors over a longer 
period. We examine the relation between IPO institutional ownership and post-IPO returns by 
running OLS regressions of post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns on IPO institutional 
ownership in the IPO issue year. For the dependent variable, post-IPO returns, we use raw post- 
IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns as well as market-adjusted post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold 
returns. The primary independent variable is the institutional ownership in the IPO issue year. 
Same as before, we use both the first and second definition of institutional ownership 
alternatively for the regressions. The other explanatory variables include discretionary accruals, 
IPO operating performance measures, the natural log of the market value of equity, the book-to- 
market ratio, sales growth, age of IPO firms, underwriter’s reputation rank, and IPO firm’s 
leverage ratio (the ratio of long-term debt to total assets). All independent variables except the 
age of IPO firms are in IPO issue year. The age of IPO firms is in pre-IPO year. The OLS 
regression equations are as follows:
BHRo = C + C1IH0 + C2DACo + C3OP0 + C4Ln(ME0) + C5BM0
+ C6 SG0 + C7AGE.1 + CgRANK + C9LEV0 + e ------(2.3)
Where
BHRo is the one-year buy-and-hold return after IPO issue date;
DACo is the discretionary accruals in the IPO issue year;
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OPo is the various operating performance measures in the IPO issue year;
MEo is the market value of equity in the IPO issue year;
BMo is the book-to-market ratio in the IPO issue year;
SGo is the sales growth in the IPO issue year.
In Table 2.5, we report the regression results of equation (2.3) when the institutional 
ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. From the results, we find that all the 
coefficients of institutional ownership are positive but insignificant. This is true when the 
dependent variable is either raw post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns or market-adjusted 
post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns. However, the findings are consistent with those of Field 
and Lowry (2005) that institutional investors can not predict future returns. According to Field 
and Lowry (2005), institutional investors are related to higher stock returns because they are 
informed investors and can identify higher quality firms and avoid firms that exhibit the worst 
performance. But institutional investors themselves can not predict firms’ stock returns. Also, we 
find that all the coefficients of discretionary accruals are negative and significant at the 5% level. 
This result holds for both the raw and market-adjusted returns. The results indicate that investors 
are aware of IPO issuers’ earnings management and react negatively. Hence, post-IPO one-year 
buy-and-hold returns are inversely related to discretionary accruals in the IPO issue year. In 
addition, we find that post-IPO returns are also significantly related to the book-to-market ratio. 
For the raw post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns, all the coefficients of the book-to-market 
ratio are positive and significant at the 10% level. For the market-adjusted (both value-weighted 
and equal-weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold returns, all the coefficients of the book-to- 
market ratio are positive and significant at the 5% level. In untabulated tests, we have similar
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results when the institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all 
institutions. The regression results above support our second hypothesis and indicate that other 
factors such as IPO accruals quality and the book-to-market ratio are more important reasons in 
affecting post-IPO stock returns, while the presence of institutional ownership itself does not 
have an impact on post-IPO stock returns.
Next, we consider discretionary accruals in both IPO issue year and pre-IPO year in the 
regressions. Since post-IPO stock returns are negatively related to IPO discretionary accruals in 
the IPO issue year, we are also very interested in investigating whether post-IPO stock returns 
are related to IPO discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year. We run regressions of post-IPO 
returns on institutional ownership, discretionary accruals in both IPO issue year and pre-IPO year, 
and other control variables. To exclude the correlation between discretionary accruals in IPO 
issue year (DACo) and discretionary accruals in pre-IPO year (DAC-i), we use the residuals to 
proxy for discretionary accruals in IPO issue year (DACo). We obtain the residuals by regressing 
discretionary accruals in IPO issue year (DACo) on discretionary accruals in pre-IPO year (DAC 
-i). The regression equation (2.3) is changed into the following:
BHRo = C + CjIHo + C2DAC.i + C3PDAC0+ C4OP0 + CsLn(MEo) + C6BM0
+ C7SG0 + CgAGE.i + C9RANK + C10LEV0 + e  (2.4)
Where PDACo is the proxy for discretionary accruals in IPO issue year, which is the 
residual obtained by regressing discretionary accruals in IPO issue year on pre-IPO discretionary 
accruals.
Table 2.6 reports the regression results of equation (2.4). In this table, institutional 
ownership is the number of institutional owners. Panel A, B and C in Table 2.6 respectively
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show the regression results when the dependent variables are raw, market-adjusted (value- 
weighted) and market-adjusted (equal-weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return. From 
the regression results, we find all the coefficients of institutional ownership are positive but 
insignificant. The results confirm the findings of Field and Lowry (2005) that institutional 
investors can not predict future returns. Second, all the coefficients of discretionary accruals in 
IPO issue year (PDACo) are still significantly negative. Again, the results indicate that the 
market reacts negatively toward IPO issuers’ earnings management. Third, almost all the 
coefficients of pre-IPO discretionary accruals (DAC-i) are not significant (only one is significant 
at the 10% level), which shows that post-IPO accruals quality rather than pre-IPO accruals 
quality determines post-IPO stock returns and that the market can not be deceived or misled by 
pre-IPO earnings management. Finally, similar to the results in Table 2.5, post-IPO returns are 
again significantly related to the book-to-market ratio. For the raw post-IPO one-year buy-and- 
hold returns, all the coefficients of the book-to-market ratio are positive and significant at the 
10% level. For the market-adjusted (both value-weighted and equal-weighted) post-IPO one-year 
buy-and-hold returns, all the coefficients of the book-to-market ratio are positive and significant 
at the 5% level. In untabulated tables, similar findings are observed using the second definition 
of institutional ownership. All of those results obtained in equation (2.4) are consistent with 
those obtained in equation (2.3).
Therefore, the regression results above support our second hypothesis. That is, post-IPO 
stock return is not directly related to the presence of post-IPO institutional ownership, but is 
determined by other more essential factors related to IPO firm characteristics such as IPO 
accruals quality and the book-to-market ratio. Taken into account other more essential factors, 
the relation between post-IPO stock return and post-IPO institutional ownership is not significant.
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The results imply that IPO firm characteristics such as post-IPO accruals quality and the book-to- 
market ratio play a more important role in determining post-IPO stock returns, while the 
presence of institutional ownership itself has no significant impact on post-IPO returns.
2.4. Robustness tests
In this section, we conduct robustness checks. We re-estimate the simultaneous equations, 
but this time we use the change in institutional ownership between the end of the fourth quarter 
and the end of the first quarter following IPO issue date rather than the institutional ownership at 
the end of IPO issue year. The purpose is to further examine whether pre-IPO earnings 
management have an effect on institutions’ investment decisions and whether there is significant 
association between the change in the post-IPO institutional ownership and pre-IPO earnings 
management.
We transform the simultaneous equations (2.1) and (2.2) a little. For measuring 
institutional ownership, we use the change in institutional ownership following the IPO issue 
date. The change in institutional ownership is equal to the difference between institutional 
ownership at the end of the fourth quarter following IPO issue date less institutional ownership at 
the end of the first quarter following the IPO date. The simultaneous equations are transformed 
as follows:
DAC-! = C + CiAIHO + C2 OP.i + C3 Ln(TA.i) + C4 Ln(OS) + C5 SG.i + CeAGE.i
+ CyRANK + CgSIC + e -------------(2.5)
AIHO = C + CiDAC.i + C2OP.i + C3 Ln(TA-i) + C4SG.1 + C5AGE.1
+ C6RANK + C7LEV0 + CgSIC + e -------------(2.6)
44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Where
AIHO is the change in institutional ownership between the end of the fourth quarter and the end 
of the first quarter following IPO issue date.
Table 2.7 reports the regression results of simultaneous equations (2.5) and (2.6). The 
institutional ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. The results of equation 
(2.5) show that the change in institutional ownership after IPO is not significantly related to pre- 
IPO discretionary accruals. The results of equation (2.6) also show that pre-IPO discretionary 
accruals have little effect on the change in institutional ownership after IPO. Thus, pre-IPO 
earnings management can not affect post-IPO institutional ownership change. The findings are 
consistent with those when we measure institutional ownership at the end of the first year after 
the IPO offer date. In unreported results, we observe similar findings when the institutional 
ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutions.
The results of robustness tests again confirm that institutional investors can not be 
deceived or misled by IPO issuers’ pre-IPO earnings management. Institutional investors rely 
heavily on post-IPO information to make their investment decisions. The findings are also 
consistent with those of Field and Lowry (2005).
2.5. Motives of IPO issuers
If post-IPO institutional ownership is not affected by pre-IPO earnings management, is it 
probably related to other motives of IPO issuers in going public? In particular, we examine 
whether initial institutional ownerships are affected by the IPO firm’s reasons of going public. 
Based on the existing IPO literature, the common motives of IPO issuers examined here are: (1)
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the signaling hypothesis (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang 1989; Welch 1989); (2) 
the market-timing hypothesis (Alti 2005; Alti 2006; Yan and Cai 2003); and (3) the asymmetric 
information hypothesis (Li, Mclnish and Wongchoti 2005; Kennedy, Sivakumar and Vetzal 2006; 
Shen and Wei 2006). We run a series of OLS regressions with the change in institutional 
ownership as the dependent variable.
(1) The signaling hypothesis
IPO issuers may signal their firm quality to attract investors. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and 
Welch (1989) use IPO underpricing as the signal. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) use an additional 
signal, the retention rate by insiders. If the desired ownership structure is a higher institutional 
ownership structure, one way to do so is to manipulate the offer price to emit the signal. If so, we 
expect a significant and positive relation between post-IPO firm performance and post-IPO 
institutional ownership. To test the signaling hypothesis, we proxy the firm quality with the 
average return on assets in years 1 and 2 after the IPO issue date. Also, we use the change in 
institutional ownership during the first four quarters following IPO issue date to proxy the post- 
IPO institutional ownership. If the signaling hypothesis is true, the coefficients of the average 
return on assets must be significantly positive.
(2) The market-timing hypothesis
It is well documented in the literature that IPO offerings are more common when the stock 
market is overvalued (Alti 2006). IPOs are therefore associated with investor sentiment that is 
overly optimistic in general (Yan and Cai 2003; Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh 2006). As a result, 
the literature has also documented significant negative long-run returns on IPOs (Ljungqvist
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1996; Schultz 2003; Yan and Cai 2003). Rational institutional investors will therefore avoid 
IPOs on average initially. Thus, we expect the initial year institutional ownership of IPOs a 
reflection of their expectation of investment returns on IPOs. We expect a positive relation 
between post-IPO stock performance and institutional ownership. More institutional investors 
are likely to invest in IPO firms if  they expect high excess returns on IPOs. To examine the 
market-timing hypothesis, we run regressions of the change in institutional ownership during the 
first four quarters following the IPO issue date on the excess return during the two-year period 
after the fourth quarter of IPO. If the market-timing hypothesis is true for IPOs, we expect to see 
a significantly positive relation between post-IPO excess returns and the change (increase) in 
post-IPO institutional ownership.
(3) The asymmetric information hypothesis
IPO investors in general do not have much information about the IPO firm. The asymmetric 
information could be so significant that IPO issuers have to underprice their offerings in order to 
overcome the winner’s curse (adverse selection) problem (Rock 1986; Beatty and Ritter 1986; 
Carter and Manaster 1990); to avoid potential legal liabilities (Hughes and Thakor 1992; Beatty 
and Welch 1996); and to induce investors to seek out more information about the IPO firm 
(Chemmanur 1993). We use the standard deviation of stock returns from day 5 to day 225 after 
IPO to measure the asymmetric information problem. We expect a high information asymmetry 
to be associated with a lower institutional ownership because of the risk involved.
After we take into account the above three hypotheses, we run the following OLS 
regression:
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AIHO = C + C ! E C R < i t o 2 ) + C 2 R O A o  + C 3R O A ( lto 2 )  +  C 4 S T D 0 + C 5 D A C . 1  +
C 6 D A C 0 +  C 7 R A N K  + C8Ln(OS) + C9LEV0 + e    (2.7)
Where
ECR<ito2) is the excess return during the 2 -year period following the end of the fourth quarter 
after IPO issue date;
ROAo is the return on total assets in the IPO issue year;
ROA(ito2) is the average return on total assets during the 2-year period following IPO issue date; 
STDo is the standard deviation of stock returns from day 5 to day 225 after IPO.
In equation (2.7), we use the return on total assets (ROA<ito2)) to proxy for future 
opportunities of IPO firms. If the signaling hypothesis is the reason for the post-IPO change in 
institutional ownership, the coefficient of the return on total assets (ROA<ito2)) should be 
significantly positive. For the market-timing hypothesis, the proxy is the excess return during the 
2 -year period following the end of the fourth quarter after IPO issue date (ECR<ito2))- If  the 
market-timing hypothesis is the reason for the post-IPO institutional ownership change, the 
coefficient of the excess return (ECR<uo2)) should be significantly positive. Finally, if the reason 
is asymmetric information, the coefficient on the standard deviation of stock returns (STDo) 
should be significantly negative. The standard deviation of stock returns from day 5 to day 225 
after IPO (STDo) serves as a measure of the information asymmetry. In addition, we also include 
other control variables, including the return on total assets in the IPO issue year (ROAo), 
discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year (DAC.i) and the IPO issue year (DACo), underwriter’s
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rank (RANK), the natural logarithm of IPO offer size (Ln(OS)) and the leverage ratio in the IPO 
issue year (LEVo).
Table 2.8 reports the results of equation (2.7). We obtain four equations alternatively by 
removing the return on total assets (ROAo) or the discretionary accruals (DACo) in the IPO issue 
year from equation (2.7). Panel A in Table 2.8 reports the results when the institutional 
ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. First, we check the coefficients of 
ROA(ito2), the average return on total assets during the 2-year period following IPO issue date, to 
examine if the signaling hypothesis is true for our sample. The results show that all the four 
coefficient of ROA(it02) are negative and only one of the coefficients of ROA(ito2) is significant at 
the 1 0 % level. The other three coefficients of ROA(ito2) are not significant. If the signaling 
hypothesis is true for our sample, we expect to see the coefficients of ROA(ito2) to be 
significantly positive. However, all the coefficients of ROA(ito2) are negatively related to the 
change in institutional ownership and only one is significant at the 10% level. Thus, the results 
do not support the signaling hypothesis in our sample. That is, the change in post-IPO 
institutional ownership is not due to the signals sent out by IPO issuers.
Second, we want to investigate if the change in post-IPO institutional ownership results 
from market-timing. We need to check the coefficient of ECR<uo2)- ECR(ito2) is the excess return 
during the second and third year after IPO. If the market-timing hypothesis is true, the coefficient 
of ECR(ito2) should be significantly positive. However, we find that all the coefficients of 
ECR(ito2) are negative and insignificant. The results suggest that the change in post-IPO 
institutional ownership is not because of market-timing. The excess returns after IPO can not 
make institutional investors to change their minds easily. Institutional investors would like to 
continue holding IPO firms of higher quality rather than seek the excess returns in the short-run.
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This also reflects that institutional investors emphasize long-run benefits rather than short-run 
returns.
Third, we consider if the change in the post-IPO institutional ownership is the result of 
asymmetric information. We use the standard deviation of stock returns from day 5 to day 225 
after IPO to measure the adverse selection cost. If the adverse selection cost is higher (lower), 
institutional investors are less (more) likely to change. We expect to see a significantly negative 
relation between the change in the post-IPO institutional ownership and the standard deviation of 
stock returns. From Panel A in Table 2.8, we find that all the coefficients of the standard 
deviation (STDo) are significant but positive. Among the four coefficients of the standard 
deviation, three are significant at the 5% level and one is significant at the 10% level. If 
asymmetric information is the reason for the change in the post-IPO institutional ownership, the 
coefficient of the standard deviation should be significant and negative. The results in Panel A of 
Table 2.8 do not provide us with the evidence. That is, asymmetric information hypothesis can 
not explain the change in the post-IPO institutional ownership in our sample.
Moreover, we conduct the robustness tests again with the institutional ownership defined 
as the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. Panel B in Table 2.8 reports the results. 
From the results, we find that only the coefficients on discretionary accruals are significant and 
negative. One is significant at the 5% level and another is significant at the 10% level. The 
coefficients on all the other variables are not significant. The results have similar implications to 
those in Panel A in Table 2.8 when the institutional ownership is defined as the number of 
institutional owners. The results in both Panel A and B in Table 2.8 indicate that there is no 
evidence to support that the change in post-IPO institutional ownership is due to any of the three 
commonly cited hypotheses: the signaling hypothesis, the market timing hypothesis, or the
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asymmetric information hypothesis. However, we notice that the change in post-IPO institutional 
ownership is inversely related to discretionary accruals in IPO issue year and the relation is 
always significant in both Panel A and B in Table 2.8. The finding suggests that institutional 
investors prefer to choose IPOs with lower discretionary accruals in IPO issue year. From Panel 
A in Table 2.8, we also find that IPOs of larger size are more likely to attract more institutional 
investors. But this is not true if the institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of shares 
owned by all institutions, which is indicated in Panel B of Table 2.8.
2.6. Conclusions
In essay two, we investigate whether IPO issuers manipulate pre-IPO earnings to achieve 
a desired post-IPO ownership structure. Specifically, we try to figure out the following two 
questions: (1) whether pre-IPO earnings management or conventional variables related to IPO 
firm characteristics such as total assets play a more important role in affecting post-IPO 
institutional ownership; and (2) whether the presence of post-IPO institutional ownership or 
other more essential factors related to IPO firm characteristics such as IPO accruals quality play 
a more significant role in affecting post-IPO stock returns. In robustness checks, we explore the 
motives of IPO issuers by examining three commonly cited hypotheses.
For the first question, we find that post-IPO institutional ownership is not related to pre- 
IPO earnings management, but still significantly related to other conventional variables related to 
IPO firm characteristics such as total assets. The reason is that institutional investors are smart 
and are not deceived or misled by pre-IPO earnings management. Moreover, institutional 
investors rely heavily on publicly available information rather than pre-IPO information to make 
their investment decisions. For the second question, we find that the presence of institutional
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ownership itself has a very little impact on post-IPO returns if we take into consideration other 
underlying factors related to IPO firm characteristics such as IPO accruals quality and the book- 
to-market ratio.
Furthermore, we conduct robustness tests to see if the change in post-IPO institutional 
ownership is due to one of the three commonly cited hypotheses on IPO firms: (1) the signaling 
hypothesis; (2) the market-timing hypothesis; and (3) the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
We use the return on total assets, the excess return, and the standard deviation respectively as the 
proxy to test the signaling hypothesis, the market-timing hypothesis, and the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. However, the results of robustness tests indicate that the change in post- 
IPO institutional ownership is not due to any of the three commonly cited hypotheses.
In sum, IPO issuers are unlikely to attract institutional investors by manipulating pre-IPO 
information. Institutional investors seem to be able to identify IPO firms of higher quality and 
always seek IPO firms with lower discretionary accruals and higher book-to-market ratios 
depending on post-IPO information, but the presence of institutional ownership itself has a very 
little impact on stock returns.
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ENDNOTES:
1. Another view of earnings management emphasizes the liabilities arising from false earnings 
signals. These include explicit legal expenses and implicit costs due to a damaged firm 
reputation. It is argued that the burdens impel stock issuers to signal validly. Thus investors are 
informed, but not deceived. Even if this view is correct, we argue that high-prestige underwriters 
will distant themselves from firms with aggressive earnings management because there would be 
undesirable effects if the underwritten firms are likely to keep reporting continuously declining 
performance when accruals revert in later reporting periods.
2. Our sample size is much larger than the 171 IPOs between 1982 and 1987 in Durcharme et al. 
(2001) that have pre-IPO accruals information.
3. DeAngelo (1986), Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) and Friedlan (1994) use year-to-year 
changes in a firm’s accruals as a measure of abnormal accruals. This differenced approach has 
several disadvantages for IPOs. If accruals are independent, and identically distributed with 
constant mean and variance, differencing will induce a negative serial correlation (of -  0.5); see 
Dechow (1994) and Choi, Gramlich, and Thomas (1993). Choi et al. also reports that first 
differences adequately capture abnormal long-term accruals (e.g. depreciation) but not abnormal 
current accruals. Furthermore, the differenced measure can be perverse if earnings management 
occurs in periods prior to the test period. The differenced measure is therefore particularly 
suspect for examining immediate post-IPO accruals, because the benchmark period (just prior to 
the IPO) may have been also manipulated.
4. In untabulated regression results, we have added ADAC and ANAC (the averages of 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals over the three-year post-IPO period) to the 
independent variables and the regression results remain consistent and similar to those in Tables 
1.5a to 1.5c.
5. We have also estimated underwriter reputation using the following simple regression model: 
ARt = C + CxDACi(t_X) + e , . However, the R-square is only 0.006 and subsequent results are
inconsistent. We therefore choose not to report the results of this particular model due to the 
concern of weak instrumental variable.
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Table 1.1
Descriptive statistics for discretionary accruals of IPO Issuers
This table presents the descriptive statistics of IPO discretionary accruals. Panel A is the 
descriptive statistics of IPO discretionary accruals by underwriter-reputation group and calendar 
year from 1996 through 2004. Panel B is the descriptive statistics of IPO discretionary accruals 
by underwriter-reputation group and event year from T = -1 through T = 3 (T = 0 is the IPO issue 
year).




Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2003 2004
Mean 0 . 0 0 -0.38 -0 . 2 1 -0.67 -0.36 -0.14 -0.06 -0.14 -0.04
Median 0 . 0 0 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05
High Max. 14.27 1.71 1.75 2.37 13.19 1 . 2 2 0.98 0.32 1.35
(N=191) Min. -20.37 -21.82 -6.09 -62.97 -42.40 -2.09 -1.58 -1 . 6 6 -0.79
Std. dev. 2.61 2.42 0 . 6 6 3.84 2.51 0.29 0.19 0.33 0.27
p-value 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Mean 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 1 -0.53 -0.14 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0 . 0 2
Median 0.15 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 -0.03 -0 . 0 2 -0.06 -0 . 0 1 -0.03 -0.04
Medium Max. 1.15 0.47 7.13 2.04 1.58 0.36 0.40 1.03 0.25
(N= 138) Min. -0.69 -1.45 -1.38 -40.18 -9.63 -1.53 -1.47 -0.63 -0.27
Std. dev. 0.48 0.34 1.06 4.82 1.25 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.15
p-value 0.84 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.77
Mean 0.28 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.13 0.04 0 . 0 0 -0.03
Median 0 . 1 2 0.04 0.04 0 . 0 2 0.05 -0.05 -0 . 0 2 -0 . 0 2 -0.03
Low Max. 1.84 2.60 3.74 6.47 4.68 2.79 0.43 0.39 -0.03
(N=38) Min. -0.94 -1.78 -2.98 -3.75 -1.18 -2.32 -0 . 2 0 -0.27 -0.03
Std. dev. 0.76 0.78 0.99 1.35 0 . 8 8 0 . 8 6 0.19 0 . 2 2 NA
p-value 0.72 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.30 0.75 NA
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Table 1.1 (continued)




Year T = -1 H
II o T = 1
(NIIH T = 3
Mean -0.71 -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 -0.13
Median -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
High Max. 14.27 13.19 1.75 0.67 1.35
(N=191) Min. -62.97 -6.09 -10.37 -9.68 -6.89
Std. Dev. 4.53 1.17 0.74 0.66 0.49
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.17 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Median -0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
Medium Max. 7.13 1.58 1.52 0.40 1.03
(N=138) Min. -1.38 -1.50 -1.53 -0.59 -0.44
Std. Dev. 1.10 0.57 0.35 0.16 0.22
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.46 0.09 0.19 -0.02 0.23
Median -0.01 0.22 0.04 0.00 -0.01
Low Max. 6.47 0.71 2.79 0.39 4.68
(N=38) Min. -0.46 -1.08 -0.97 -0.59 -0.76
Std. Dev. 1.69 0.48 0.78 0.21 1.20
p-value 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.00
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Table 1.2
t-test ( x 1 test) for the equality of means (medians) of discretionary accruals across 
underwriter-reputation groups
This table reports the means (medians) o f  discretionary accruals for high-, medium-, and low- 
reputation groups. This table also presents the results o f  t-test and chi-square test for the equality 
o f the means (medians) o f  discretionary accruals across underwriter-reputation groups. H, M and 
L denote IPO firms associated with high-, medium-, and low-reputation underwriters 
respectively. * represents significance at the 5% level.
Reputation
groups
T = -1 H II o T =  1 T = 2 H II U)
Mean(median) Mean(median) Mean(median) Mean(median) Mean(median)
H -0.71 (-0.08) -0.22(-0.09) -0.17(-0.06) -0.14(-0.05) -0.13(-0.03)
M 0.17(-0.04) 0.11(0.07) -0.03(-0.01) -0.01 (-0.01) -0.01 (-0.04)
L 0.46(-0.01) 0.09( 0.22) 0.19( 0.04) -0.02( 0.00) 0.23(-0.01)
H vs. M 2.01 *(8.72*) 0.40(13.40*) 0.28(6.75*) 1.51(4.75*) 3.46*(3.82)
M vs. L 0.85(0.56) 0.96(0.14) 1.95(10.27*) 2.19*(2.74) 1.36(2.06)
H vs. L 2.05*(3.55*) 2.00*(8.40*) 2.38*(17.61*) 1.58(0.01) 2.12*(8.31*)
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Table 1.3
Regression analysis of initial firm value
This table reports the OLS regression results o f IPO initial firm value on accruals and other IPO 
firm characteristics. FV is the initial firm value. DAC and NAC denote discretionary accruals 
and nondiscretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth rate. OP is pre-IPO operating performance 
measured by the next six variables. ORA is the operating return on assets. OCFRA is the 
operating cash flow return on assets. ROA is return on assets. IORA, IOCFRA, and IROA are 
the industry-adjusted ORA, OCFRA, and ROA respectively. Ln(OS) is the natural logarithm o f  
offer size in the IPO offer year. AGE denotes the age o f  issuing firm. SD is the standard 
deviation o f daily returns from day 6 to day 255. The dependent variable (FV) is for the IPO 
offer year. All the independent variables except ln(OS) and SD are for the pre-IPO year. * 
represents significance at the 5% level.
FVt — C + C .D A C ^  + C2NACt{l_x) + +C4OPî t_l-)
+ C6 lntOS), + C jA G E ^^  + CiSDj + et
Panel A: High-Reputation Group
DAC -1.05 -1.48 -1.80 -2.03 -1.92 -1.68
NAC 2.21 1.78 0.99 0.65 0.45 0.60







Ln(OS) 1363* 1361* 1390* 1277* 1288* 1375*
AGE 1.27 1.61 3.20 4.87 3.92 3.55
SD 12659* 12261* 12348* 13376* 12756* 12425*
R2 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.38
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Table 1.3 (continued)
Panel B: Medium-Reputation Group
DAC -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.15 -0.23 -0.40
NAC 0 . 6 6 0.44 1.09 0.95* 0.92* 0.83







Ln(OS) 262* 260* 271* 271* 268* 264*
AGE -0.46 -0.67 -0.29 -0.33 -0.40 -0.14
SD 1784* 1743* 1355* 1482* 1565* 1830*
R2 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 6 0.65 0.65 0.65 0 . 6 6
Panel C: Low-Reputation Group
DAC 7.15* 7.34* 7.81* 7.60* 7.52* 7.83*
NAC 8.49* 8.84* 8.37* 9.04* 9.05* 8.53*







Ln(OS) 93.16* 91.55* 81.34* 89.65* 89.76* 81.83*
AGE 0.77 0.77 0.57 0.70 0.74 0.47
SD -0.02 -0.05 -0.33 -0.08 -0.06 -0.25
R2 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.84
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Table 1.4
Mean (Median) change of industry-adjusted operating performance measures
This table presents the mean (median) changes of industry-adjusted operating performance 
between pre-IPO year (T = -1) and post-IPO years (T = 1, 2, or 3). IORA is the industry-adjusted 
operating return on assets (operating income before taxes and depreciation divided by total 
assets); IOCFRA is the industry-adjusted operating cash flow return on assets ((operating income 
before taxes and depreciation minus capital expenditures) divided by total assets); IROA is the 
industry-adjusted return on assets (net income divided by total assets). * represents significance 
at the 5% level.
Panel A: High-reputation
Years relative to completion of IPO
- 1  to 0 - 1  to + 1 - 1  to + 2 -1 to +3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
IORA 0.92 0.07* 1.34* 0.12 1.35* 0.11 1.41* 0 . 1 0
IOCFRA 1 . 0 0 0.05 1.56* 0.19* 1.59* 0.16* 1.65* 0.18*
IROA 1.04* 0.07 1.44* 0.15* 1.44* 0.14 1.63* 0.14*
Panel B: Medium-reputation
Years relative to completion of IPO
- 1  to 0 - 1  to + 1 - 1  to + 2 -1 to +3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
IORA 0.62 0.07 1.06* 0 . 1 2 1.01* 0.07 1 .1 1 * 0.05
IOCFRA 0.73 0.07 1.32* 0.08 1.27* 0.09 1.40* 0 .1 0 *
IROA 0.70 0.07 1 .2 2 * 0 .1 2 * 1.19* 0.08 1.30* 0.08
Panel C: Low-reputation
Years relative to completion of IPO
- 1  to 0 - 1  to + 1 - 1  to + 2 -1 to +3
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
IORA 0.15 0.03 0.69 -0 . 0 2 0.62 -0.07 0 . 6 8 -0.03*
IOCFRA -0.03 -0 .0 2 * 0.67 -0.05* 0.67 -0.05* 0.72 -0.06*
IROA -0 . 2 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0.00 -0.05 0 . 0 0 -0 . 0 2
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Table 1.5a
Regression analysis of post-issue operating performance for IPOs underwritten by high- 
reputation underwriters
This table presents the regression results of post-IPO operating performance on IPO 
characteristics. Here the IPO firms are underwritten by high-reputation underwriters. Panel A, 
Panel B and Panel C show the results when the dependent variables are AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 
alternatively. AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 are the average industry-adjusted operating return on 
assets, cash flow return on assets, and return on assets between years T=1 and T=3 respectively. 
DAC and NAC denote discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth. OP is 
operating performance measured by the next three parameters. IORA is the industry-adjusted 
Operating Return on Assets in year T=-l. IOCFRA is the industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow 
Return on Assets in year T=-l. IROA is the industry-adjusted Return on Assets in year T=-l. 
Ln(OS) is the natural logarithm of offer size in the IPO offer year. AGE denotes the age of 
issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to day 255. * represents 
significance at the 5% level.
AIM, — C + ClDACl(t_l) + C 2NACi(t_X) + C3 S,Gi((_1) + C 4 G/*(M)
+ C6 lnfOS), + C1AGEiff_V) + CsSDi + e,
Panel A: AIM1 is the average industry-adjusted operating return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
NAC -0.018 -0.020 -0.025




Ln(OS) 0.041* 0.041* 0.041*
AGE 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
SD -3.644* -3.634* -3.680*
R2 0.27 0.26 0.27
Panel B: AIM2 is the average industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.004 -0.004 -0.008
NAC -0.034 -0.036 -0.040




Ln(OS) 0.049* 0.048* 0.048*
AGE 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
SD -3.056* -3.017* -3.086*
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23
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Table 1.5a (high-reputation underwriters group continued)
Panel C: AIM3 is the average industry-adjusted return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.005 -0.004 -0.010
NAC -0.045 -0.048 -0.048




Ln(OS) 0.096* 0.095* 0.096*
AGE 0.001 0.001 0.001
SD -3.252 -3.215 -3.399*
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
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Table 1.5b
Regression analysis of post-issue operating performance for IPOs underwritten by 
medium-reputation underwriters
This table presents the regression results of post-IPO operating performance on IPO 
characteristics. Here the IPO firms are underwritten by medium-reputation underwriters. Panel A, 
Panel B and Panel C show the results when the dependent variables are AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 
alternatively. AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 are the average industry-adjusted operating return on 
assets, cash flow return on assets, and return on assets between years T=1 and T=3 respectively. 
DAC and NAC denote discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth. OP is 
operating performance measured by the next three parameters. IORA is the industry-adjusted 
Operating Return on Assets in year T=-l. IOCFRA is the industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow 
Return on Assets in year T=-l. IROA is the industry-adjusted Return on Assets in year T=-l. 
Ln(OS) is the natural logarithm of offer size in the IPO offer year. AGE denotes the age of 
issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to day 255. * represents 
significance at the 5% level.
AIM, -  C + C,DAC,„_lt + C2NAC,f,_n + C,SG,(M) + Ct OP„,_„
+ C6 li\(OS)i + C -jA G E ^  + CiSDi + ei 
Panel A: AIM1 is the average industry-adjusted operating return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.02 0.00 -0.03
NAC -0.08* -0.06 -0.08*




Ln(OS) 0.07* 0.07* 0.07*
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD -3.98* -4.20* -3.98*
R2 0.21 0.21 0 . 2 1
Panel B: AIM2 is the average industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0 . 0 2 -0.004 -0.03
NAC -0.09* -0.07 -0.09*
SG -0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
IORA 0 . 0 1
IOCFRA 0 . 0 0 2
IROA 0 . 0 1
Ln(OS) 0.08* 0.08* 0.08*
AGE 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
SD -3.08* -3.26* -3.07*
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19
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Table 1.5b (medium-reputation underwriters group continued)
Panel C: AIM3 is the average industry-adjusted return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC 0.00 0.04 -0.03
NAC -0.03 0.00 -0.06




Ln(OS) 0.04 0.04 0.04
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD -4.94* -5.21* -4.73*
R2 0.23 0.24 0.24
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Table 1.5c
Regression analysis of post-issue operating performance for IPOs underwritten by low- 
reputation underwriters
This table presents the regression results of post-IPO operating performance on IPO 
characteristics. Here the IPO firms are underwritten by low-reputation underwriters. Panel A, 
Panel B and Panel C show the results when the dependent variables are AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 
alternatively. AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 are the average industry-adjusted operating return on 
assets, cash flow return on assets, and return on assets between years T=1 and T=3 respectively. 
DAC and NAC denote discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth. OP is 
operating performance measured by the next three parameters. IORA is the industry-adjusted 
Operating Return on Assets in year T=-l. IOCFRA is the industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow 
Return on Assets in year T=-l. IROA is the industry-adjusted Return on Assets in year T=-l. 
Ln(OS) is the natural logarithm of offer size in the IPO offer year. AGE denotes the age of 
issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to day 255. * represents 
significance at the 5% level.
AIM, = C + C,DACiit_l )+ C2NACi(t.X) + C3SG,,M) + C 4 OPi(M)
+ C6 lnfOS1), + C1AGEi{t_l) + CsSDi + et 
Panel A: AIM1 is the average industry-adjusted operating return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.11* -0.16* -0.14*
NAC -0.29* -0.35* -0.33*




Ln(OS) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
AGE 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
SD 0.00 0.01 0.00
R2 0.62 0.64 0.62
Panel B: AIM2 is the average industry-adjusted cash flow return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.07 -0.12 -0.09
NAC -0.23* -0.29* -0.26*




Ln(OS) 0.00 0.01 -0.01
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00
SD 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.56 0.59 0.54
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Table 1.5c (low-reputation underwriters group continued)
Panel C: AIM3 is the average industry-adjusted return on assets between T=1 and T=3
DAC -0.10* -0.15* -0.12*
NAC -0.25* -0.31* -0.29*




Ln(OS) -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
AGE 0.004* 0.004 0.005*
SD -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
R2 0.72 0.74 0.70
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Table 1.6
Three models for computing the instrumental variable - estimated reputation of 
underwriters
The following tables report the regression results of three models for computing the instrumental 
variable - the estimated reputation (ER). Panel A, B and C are for the models (1.9), (1.10) and 
(1.11) respectively. We apply the regression coefficients from each model (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) 
to the sample to compute each underwriter’s estimated reputation. We estimate ER using three 
different ways in order to address the possibility of getting a weak instrumental variable. AR is 
the actual reputation ranking of underwriters per Carter and Manaster (1990). DAC-i is the pre- 
IPO discretionary accruals. TA _i is the pre-IPO total assets. SD is the standard deviation of daily 
returns from day 6  to day 255 after IPO; AGE.i is the age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year.
Panel A: AR = C + Ci* DAC.i + C2 *Ln(TA .0  + C3 *[Ln(TA .i) ] 2 + e
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.0624 0.2629 23.0632 0.0000
DAC.i -0.0239 0.0167 -1.4305 0.1532
Ln(TA _i) 0.7824 0.1221 6.4061 0.0000
[Ln(TA .i) ] 2 -0.0525 0.0132 -3.9667 0.0001
R2 = 0.16
= C + Ci* DAC.i + C2 *Ln(TA .i) + C3 *[Ln(TA .i) ] 2 + C4*SD + e
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.2000 0.2568 24.1460 0.0000
DAC.! -0.0242 0.0162 -1.4934 0.1360
Ln(TA.,) 0.7467 0.1188 6.2863 0.0000
[Ln(TA _i) ] 2 -0.0503 0.0129 -3.9148 0.0001
SD -0.1743 0.0336 -5.1900 0.0000
R2 = 0.21
= C + Ci* DAC.! + C2 *Ln(TA .i) + C3 *[Ln(TA .i) ] 2 + C4*SD + C5*A
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.4208 0.2624 24.4731 0.0000
DAC., -0.0226 0.0160 -1.4127 0.1584
Ln(TA.,) 0.6663 0.1211 5.5009 0.0000
[Ln(TA.i) ] 2 -0.0373 0.0131 -2.8398 0.0047
SD -0.1712 0.0333 -5.1458 0.0000
AGE.i -0.0097 0.0032 -3.0815 0.0022
R2 = 0.21
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Table 1.7
Control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of underwriters
(Instrumental variable ER is estimated using model (1.9))
This table reports the regression results of IPO initial firm value or the average industry-adjusted 
operating performance on IPO firm characteristics by using the estimated reputation (ER). The 
purpose is to control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of 
underwriters. The instrumental variable, ER, is estimated using model (1.9): AR = C + Ci* 
DAC.i + C2 *Ln(TA .i) + C3 *[Ln(TA _i) ] 2 + e. Panel A shows the results when the dependent 
variable is the IPO initial firm value (FV). Panel B, C, and D show the results when the 
dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets (AIM1), the 
average industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets (AIM2), and the average 
industry-adjusted Return on Assets (AIM3) respectively. FV is the initial firm value. DAC is 
discretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth rate. ORA is Operating Return on Assets in year T 
= -1. OCFRA is Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets in year T = -1. ROA is Return on Assets 
in year T = -1. IORA, IOCFRA, and IROA are the industry-adjusted ORA, OCFRA, and ROA. 
AGE denotes the age of issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to 
day 255. The dependent variable (FV) is for the IPO offer year. ER is the estimated reputation of 
the underwriter. *,** represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A:
(1) FV = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_X + C3OP,_x + C,AGEt_x + C5STD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -316.837* -225.019 -224.570 -243.327** -213.193 -211.935
DAC 0.353 0.320 0.538 0.451 0.346 0.534







AGE -0.373 -0.453 -0.505 -0.455 -0.495 -0.538
STD -5.140* -5.266* -5.189* -5.210* -5.288* -5.217*
ER 70.369* 57.291* 57.102* 59.777* 55.714* 55.381*
R2 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12
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Table 1.7 (continued)
Panel B:
























































R 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.12
Panel C:
(3) AIM2 = C + CXDAC,_X + C2SG,_X + C3OPt_x + CaAGE,_x + C5STD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -0.6143* -0.5912* -0.6038* -0.5873* -0.5706* -0.5798*
DAC -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00002







AGE 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009
STD 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013
ER 0.0793* 0.0771* 0.0784* 0.0763* 0.0746* 0.0753*
R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12
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Table 1.7 (continued)
Panel D: 
(4) AIM7> = C + C]DACl_] + C2SGt_x + C3OPIA + C4AGEiA + CsSTD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -0.8279* -0.8326* -0.8227* -0.8009* -0.8084* -0.8007*
DAC -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00008







AGE 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013
STD -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0014
ER 0.1035* 0.1050* 0.1033* 0.1006* 0.1021* 0.1005*
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13
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Table 1.8
Control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of underwriters
(Instrumental variable ER is estimated using model (1.10))
This table reports the regression results of IPO initial firm value or the average industry-adjusted 
operating performance on IPO firm characteristics by using the estimated reputation (ER). The 
purpose is to control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of 
underwriters. The instrumental variable, ER, is estimated using model (1.10): AR = C + Ci* 
DAC.i + C2 *Ln(TA .i)+ C3 *[Ln(TA .i) ] 2 +C4 *STD + e. Panel A shows the results when the 
dependent variable is the IPO initial firm value (FV). Panel B, C, and D show the results when 
the dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets (AIM1), the 
average industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets (AIM2), and the average 
industry-adjusted Return on Assets (AIM3) respectively. FV is the initial firm value. DAC is 
discretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth rate. ORA is Operating Return on Assets in year T 
= -1. OCFRA is Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets in year T = -1. ROA is Return on Assets 
in year T = -1. IORA, IOCFRA, and IROA are the industry-adjusted ORA, OCFRA, and ROA. 
AGE denotes the age o f issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to 
day 255. The dependent variable (FV) is for the IPO offer year. ER is the estimated reputation of 
the underwriter. *, ** represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A:
(1) FV = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_x + C3OPt_x + C,AGE,_X + CSER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -134.885** -106.193 -104.502 -112.068 -101.584 -100.025
DAC 0.263 0.269 0.501 0.396 0.302 0.504







AGE -0.169 -0.292 -0.348 -0.288 -0.343 -0.392
ER 43.093* 39.110* 38.751* 39.821* 38.576* 38.215*
R2 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
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Table 1.8 (continued)
Panel B:
(2) AIM \  = C + CXDAC,_X + C2SGt_x + C3OPM + C^AGE,_X + CSER + e
Variable Coefficients
C -0.2773“ -0.2735“ -0.2664“ -0.2603“ -0.2628“ -0.2551
DAC -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00005 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00005







AGE 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010
ER 0.0355 0.0359 0.0346 0.0340 0.0348 0.0333
R2 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11
inel C:
) A IM 2 = C + CxDACt_x + C2SGt_x + C3OPt_x + C,AGE, _j + Cj ER + 6
Variable Coefficients
C -0.3370* -0.3227* -0.3270* -0.3193* -0.3113* -0.3144*
DAC -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00004







AGE 0.0012“ 0.0011 0.0013* 0.0012“ 0.0011 0.0013*
ER 0.0398“ 0.0389“ 0.0391“ 0.0382“ 0.0377“ 0.0376“
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11
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Table 1.8 (continued)
Panel D:
(4) AIM3 = C + CxDACtA + C2SGM + C3OP,_, + C4AGE,_X +CsER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -0.5250* -0.5238* -0.5166* -0.5066* -0.5106* -0.5047*
DAC -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001







AGE 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0017
ER 0.0602** 0.0610** 0.0597** 0.0586 0.0596** 0.0583
R2 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
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Table 1.9
Control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of underwriters
(Instrumental variable ER is estimated using model (1.11))
This table reports the regression results of IPO initial firm value or the average industry-adjusted 
operating performance on IPO firm characteristics by using the estimated reputation (ER). The 
purpose is to control for endogeneity between earnings management and the choice of 
underwriters. The instrumental variable, ER, is estimated using model (1.11): AR = C + Ci* 
DAC.i + C2*Ln(TA .i) + C3 *[Ln(TA _i) ] 2 + C4 *STD + Cs*AGE + e. Panel A shows the results 
when the dependent variable is the IPO initial firm value (FV). Panel B, C, and D show the 
results when the dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets 
(AIM1), the average industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets (AIM2), and the 
average industry-adjusted Return on Assets (AIM3) respectively. FV is the initial firm value. 
DAC is discretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth rate. ORA is Operating Return on Assets 
in year T = -1. OCFRA is Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets in year T = -1. ROA is Return 
on Assets in year T = -1. IORA, IOCFRA, and IROA are the industry-adjusted ORA, OCFRA, 
and ROA. AGE denotes the age of issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns 
from day 6  to day 255. The dependent variable (FV) is for the IPO offer year. ER is the 
estimated reputation of the underwriter. *, ** represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.
Panel A:
(1) FV = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_x + C3OP,_x + C4ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -137.498** -115.495 -115.991 -120.914 -112.972 -113.430
DAC 0.222 0.249 0.489 0,373 0.290 0.501







ER 43.027* 39.790* 39.643* 40.439* 39.463* 39.304*
R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11
79
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1.9 (continued)
Panel B:
(2) A1M\ = C + CXDAC,_X + C2SGt_x + C3OPt,x + C4ER + e
Variable Coefficients
C -0.3126** -0.3126** -0.2925** -0.3014** -0.3075** -0.2865**
DAC 0.00005 0.00006 0.00004 0.00005 0.00006 0.00004







ER 0.0401** 0.0408** 0.0383 0.0393** 0.0404** 0.0376
R2 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 1
inel C:
) A IM 2 = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_x + C3OPt_x + C4ER + e
Variable Coefficients
C -0.3436* -0.3353** -0.3240** -0.3317* -0.3296** -0.3169**
DAC 0.00007 0.00008 0.00007 0.00007 0.00009 0.00007







ER 0.0410** 0.0407** 0.0392 0.0401** 0.0402** 0.0384
R2 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 0.09 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 0
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Table 1.9 (continued)
Panel D:
(4) AIM3 = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_X + C3OPM + CAER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -0.4961** -0.4925** -0.4654 -0.4807** -0.4844** -0.4581
DAC 0.00005 0.00006 0.00004 0.00005 0.00007 0.00004







ER 0.0563 0.0569 0.0535 0.0552 0.0562 0.0526
R2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
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Table 1.10
Weighted least squares regression (instrumental variable ER is estimated using model (1.9))
This table reports the weighted least squares regression results of IPO initial firm value or the 
average industry-adjusted operating performance on IPO firm characteristics. The purpose is to 
avoid the impact on our results driven by the difference in the sizes of high-, medium-, and low- 
reputation groups. In the weighted least squares regression, each group receives equal weight in 
the estimation. The instrumental variable, ER, is estimated using model (1.9): AR = C + Ci* 
DAC.i + C2 *Ln(TA _i) + C3 *[Ln(TA _i) ] 2 + e. Panel A shows the results when the dependent 
variable is the IPO initial firm value (FV). Panel B, C, and D show the results when the 
dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted Operating Return on Assets (AIM1), the 
average industry-adjusted Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets (AIM2), and the average 
industry-adjusted Return on Assets (AIM3) respectively. FV is the initial firm value. DAC is 
discretionary accruals. SG is the sales growth rate. ORA is Operating Return on Assets in year T 
= -1. OCFRA is Operating Cash Flow Return on Assets in year T = -1. ROA is Return on Assets 
in year T = -1. IORA, IOCFRA, and IROA are the industry-adjusted ORA, OCFRA, and ROA. 
AGE denotes the age of issuing firm. SD is the standard deviation of daily returns from day 6  to 
day 255. The dependent variable (FV) is for the IPO offer year. ER is the estimated reputation of 
the underwriter. *, ** represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A:
(1) FV = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_x + C3OP,_x + C4AGEt_x + C5STD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c 0.354* 0.353* 0.353* 0.354* 0.351* 0.352*
DAC 0.111 0.108 0.116 0.130 0.144 0.124







AGE 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.002
STD -0.978* -0.978* -0.979* -0.987* -0.979* -0.981*
ER 6.686* 6.686* 6.696* 6.706* 6.666* 6.697*
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
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Table 1.10 (continued)
Panel B:
(2) AIM l  = C + CxDACt_, + C2SGt_, + C3OP(_, + CaAGEm + CsSTD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
C -0.0007* -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0006*
DAC 0.0026 0.0026 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024







AGE 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
STD -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0030
ER 0.0155* 0.0156* 0.0151* 0.0148* 0.0151* 0.0149*
R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
inel C:
) A IM 2 = C + ClDACl_l + C2SGt_x + C2OPt_x + CaAGE,__j + CsSTD + C6ER + c
Variable Coefficients
C -0.0006* -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0005**
DAC 0.0025 0.0026 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024







AGE 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
STD -0.0042** -0.0042** -0.0042** -0.0040** -0.0041** -0.0041**
ER 0.0110* 0.0111* 0.0106* 0.0104* 0.0107* 0.0105*
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
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Table 1.10 (continued)
Panel D:
(4) AIM3 = C + CxDACt_x + C2SG,_X + C,OPt_x + C<AGE,_X + CsSTD + C6ER + e
Variable Coefficients
c -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0008* -0.0008*
DAC 0.0023 0.0025 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021







AGE 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
STD -0.0099* -0.0099* -0.0098* -0.0096* -0.0097* -0.0097*
ER 0.0149* 0.0149* 0.0143* 0.0139* 0.0143* 0.0141*
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
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Table 2.1
Data description of institutional ownership at the end of each period after IPO
This table presents the sample descriptive statistics of institutional ownership. Panel A is the data 
descriptive statistics of institutional ownership when the institutional ownership is defined as the 
number of institutional owners; Panel B is the data descriptive statistics of institutional 
ownership when the institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all 
institutions. Q l, Q2, Q3 and Q4 denote the end of the first quarter, the second quarter, the third 
quarter and the fourth quarter respectively; Y2 and Y3 denote the end of the first year and the 
second year respectively.
Panel A: institutional ownership - the number of institutional owners
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Y2 Y3
Mean 31.90 34.05 40.34 45.23 56.24 63.50
Median 29.00 28.00 31.00 35.00 40.50 46.00
Maximum 264.00 428.00 391.00 367.00 402.00 508.00
Minimum 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Std. Dev. 24.75 33.09 40.09 44.21 57.58 64.20
Probability 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Obs. 484 484 484 484 484 484
B: institutional ownership - the percentage of shares owned by all institutions
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Y2 Y3
Mean 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.40
Median 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 2 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.36
Maximum 1 . 0 0 0.99 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
Minimum 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.19 0.18 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 1 0.26 0.28
Probability 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
Obs. 484 484 484 484 484 484
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
Table 2.2
IPO offer prices with different post-IPO institutional ownership and pre-IPO discretionary 
accruals
This table reports the means (medians) of IPO offer price with different post-IPO institutional 
ownership and pre-IPO discretionary accruals. Panel A is for the first definition of institutional 
ownership: the number of institutional owners; Panel B is for the second definition of 
institutional ownership: the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. High, medium or low 
denotes IPO firms with top, medium or low one-third discretionary accruals; H, M or L denotes 
IPO firms with top, medium or low one-third institutional ownership. The numbers in the table 
are means (medians) of IPO offer prices.
Panel A: institutional ownership -  the number of institutional owners
Discretionary Institutional Ownership at the End of the First Quarter










Panel B: institutional ownership - the percentage of shares owned by all institutions
Discretionary Institutional Ownership at the End of the First Quarter
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Table 2.3
Regression results of simultaneous equations (institutional ownership definition 1)
This table reports the regression results of simultaneous equations. The institutional ownership is 
defined as the number of institutional owners. Panel A is for the first equation when the 
dependent variable is the discretionary accruals. Panel B is for the second equation when the 
dependent variable is the institutional ownership. DAC.i is the discretionary accruals in the pre- 
IPO year; IHo is the institutional ownership one-year after IPO issue date; OP-i is the operating 
performance in the pre-IPO year, which is measured by operating return on assets (ORA.i), 
operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA-i), or return on assets (ROA-i) alternatively; 
Ln(TA.i) is the natural log of IPO firms’ total assets in the pre-IPO year; Ln(OS) is the natural 
log of IPO firms’ offer size; SG.i is the sales growth in the pre-IPO year; AGE.1 is the age of IPO 
firms in the pre-IPO year; RANK is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter; LEVo is IPO 
firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt / total assets) in the IPO issue year; SIC is a series of 
industry dummy variables based on IPO firms’ standard industrial classification code. *, ** 
represent the significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: discretionary accruals
DAC_X = C  + CXIH0 + C2OPL, + C,Ln(TA_x) + C,Ln(OS) + C5SG_X + C6AGE_X + C1RANK + C,SIC + e
Variables Coefficients
c 0.8545“ 1.0147* 0.9893“ 0.8937“ 1.0058* 0.9917“







Ln(TA.i) -0.0820 -0.0643 -0.0653 -0.0758 -0.0592 -0.0605
Ln(OS) -0.0009 -0.0349 -0.0714 -0.0065 -0.0397 -0.0774
SG.i -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0025
AGE.1 -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0009
RANK -0.0887 -0.0900 -0.0457 -0.0906 -0.0915 -0.0456
R2 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.71
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Panel B: institutional ownership
IH0 =C + ClDAC_1 + C2OP_x + C3Ln(TA_x) + C4SG_, + CSAGE_X + C6RANK + C.LEV^ + C%SIC + e
Variables * Coefficients
c 3.623 2.923 4.096 3.695 2.916 4.098







Ln(TA-i) 14.502* 14.711* 14.484* 14.501* 14.714* 14.485*
SG.i 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.023
AGE.i -0.263* -0.269* -0.263* -0.263* -0.269* -0.263*
RANK 10.481* 10.496* 10.379* 10.474* 10.491* 10.378*
LEV0 -54.058* -55.059* -54.314* -54.065* -55.066* -54.317*
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
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Table 2.4
Regressions results of simultaneous equations (institutional ownership definition 2)
This table reports the regression results of simultaneous equations. The institutional ownership is 
defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. Panel A is for the first equation 
when the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals. Panel B is for the second equation 
when the dependent variable is the institutional ownership. DAC.i is the discretionary accruals in 
the pre-IPO year; IHo is the institutional ownership one-year after IPO issue date; OP-i is the 
operating performance in the pre-IPO year, which is measured by operating return on assets 
(ORA.i), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRA_i), or return on assets (ROA_i) 
alternatively; Ln(TA.i) is the natural log of IPO firms’ total assets in the pre-IPO year; Ln(OS) is 
the natural log of IPO firms’ offer size; SG.i is the sales growth in the pre-IPO year; AGE.i is the 
age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year; RANK is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter; LEVo 
is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt / total assets) in the IPO issue year; SIC is a series of 
industry dummy variables based on IPO firms’ standard industrial classification code. *, ** 
represent the significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: discretionary accruals
DAC_i = C + C ,//f0 + C2OP_, + C3L n(T A ) + C4Ln(OS) + C5SG_, + C6AGE_X + CnRANK + CtSIC + e
Variables Coefficients
c 0.8699** 1.0313* 0.9766** 0.9105** 1.0221* 0.9781**







Ln(TA.i) -0.0810 -0.0618 -0.0650 -0.0746 -0.0564 -0.0599
Ln(OS) -0.0033 -0.0338 -0.0662 -0.0083 -0.0377 -0.0710
SG.i -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0025
AGE.i -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0010
RANK -0.0888 -0.0895 -0.0452 -0.0906 -0.0909 -0.0451
R2 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.71
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Table 2.4 (continued)
Panel B: institutional ownership
IH0 =C + CXDAC_X + C2OP_x + CiLn(TA_l) + C45G_, + C5AGE_l + C6RANK + C7LEV0 + CsSIC + e
Variables Coefficients
c 0.190* 0.186* 0.191* 0.191* 0.187* 0.192*







Ln(TA.,) 0.038* 0.039* 0.038* 0.038* 0.039* 0.038*
SG., -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
AGE., -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
RANK 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
LEV0 -0.022 -0.030 -0.024 -0.022 -0.030 -0.024
R2 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12
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Table 2.5
Regression results of post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return on IPO firm characteristics 
(with discretionary accruals only in IPO issue year)
This table presents the regression results of post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return on IPO firm 
characteristics with discretionary accruals only in IPO issue year. The institutional ownership is 
defined as the number of institutional owners. Panel A, B, and C report the results when we use 
the raw, market-adjusted (value-weighted) and market-adjusted (equal-weighted) post-IPO one- 
year buy-and-hold return respectively. BHRo is the post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return; IHo 
is the institutional ownership one-year after IPO issue date; DACo is the discretionary accruals in 
the IPO issue year; OPo is the operating performance in the IPO issue year, which is measured by 
operating return on assets (ORAo), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRAo), or return on 
assets (ROAo) alternatively; Ln(MEo) is the natural log of the market value of equity in the IPO 
issue year; BMo is the book-to-market ratio in the IPO issue year; SGo is the sales growth in the 
IPO issue year; AGE.i is the age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year; RANK is the reputation rank 
of the lead underwriter; LEVo is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt / total assets) in the 
IPO issue year. *, ** represent the significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
BHRo = C + CiIHo + C2DAC0 + C3OP0 + C4Ln(MEo) + C5BM0 
+ CeSGo + C7AGE-1 + CsRANK + C9LEV0 + e
Panel A: raw post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
c 0.708 0.728 0.738 0.710 0.736 0.739
IHo 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003







Ln(MEo) -0.150 -0.145 -0.172 -0.145 -0.143 -0.169
BM0 0.307“ 0.310“ 0.303“ 0.312“ 0.313“ 0.306“
SGo 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.012 0.005
AGE.! -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
RANK -0.012 -0.020 0.010 -0.017 -0.024 0.006
LEVo 0.585 0.577 0.632 0.570 0.569 0.622
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
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Table 2.5 (continued)
Panel B: market-adjusted (value-weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
C 0.262 0.278 0.282 0.262 0.285 0.283
IHo 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003







Ln(MEo) -0.080 -0.074 -0.100 -0.074 -0.072 -0.096
BM0 0.365* 0.368* 0.361* 0.370* 0.372* 0.364*
SG0 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.013 0.006
AGE.i -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
RANK -0.010 -0.018 0.011 -0.016 -0.022 0.007
LEV0 0.529 0.518 0.573 0.511 0.509 0.562
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
Panel C: market-adjusted (equal-weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
C 0.427 0.449 0.451 0.429 0.456 0.452
IH0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002







Ln(MEo) -0.107 -0.102 -0.128 -0.101 -0.100 -0.125
BM0 0.356* 0.360* 0.352* 0.361* 0.364* 0.356*
SG0 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.015 0.008
AGE-i -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
RANK -0.002 -0.011 0.020 -0.008 -0.014 0.016
LEV0 0.466 0.458 0.514 0.449 0.449 0.503
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
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Table 2.6
Regression results of post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return on IPO firm characteristics 
(with discretionary accruals in both pre-IPO year and IPO issue year)
This table presents the regression results of post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return on IPO firm 
characteristics with discretionary accruals in both pre-IPO year and IPO issue year. The 
institutional ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. Panel A, B, and C report 
the results when we use the raw, market-adjusted (value-weighted) and market-adjusted (equal- 
weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return respectively. BHRo is the post-IPO one-year 
buy-and-hold return; IHo is the institutional ownership one-year after IPO issue date; DAC.i is 
the pre-IPO discretionary accruals; PDACo is the proxy for the discretionary accruals in the IPO 
issue year; OPo is the operating performance in the IPO issue year, which is measured by 
operating return on assets (ORAo), operating cash flow return on assets (OCFRAo), or return on 
assets (ROAo) alternatively; Ln(MEo) is the natural log of the market value of equity in the IPO 
issue year; BMo is the book-to-market ratio in the IPO issue year; SGo is the sales growth in the 
IPO issue year; AGE.i is the age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year; RANK is the reputation rank 
of the lead underwriter; LEVo is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt / total assets) in the 
IPO issue year. *, ** represent the significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
BHRo = C + Cifflo + C2DAC.i + C3PDAC0+ C4OP0 + C5Ln(MEo) + C6BM0 
+ C7SG0 + CgAGE.i + C9RANK + C 10LEV0 + e
Panel A: raw post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
c 0.7428 0.7585 0.7492 0.7451 0.7664 0.7509
IHo 0.0028 0.0026 0.0031 0.0026 0.0025 0.0030
DAC.i 0.0510 0.0488 0.0610** 0.0489 0.0473 0.0595







Ln(MEo) -0.1468 -0.1415 -0.1623 -0.1418 -0.1396 -0.1594
BMo 0.3139** 0.3161** 0.3088** 0.3183** 0.3191** 0.3108**
SGo 0 . 0 1 1 1 0.0140 0.0069 0.0131 0.0149 0.0082
AGE.! -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0037
RANK 0 . 0 1 2 1 0.0046 0.0308 0.0068 0 . 0 0 1 1 0.0274
LEVo 0.5897 0.5796 0.6320 0.5747 0.5719 0.6228
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Panel B: market-adjusted (value-weighted) post-IPO one-year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
C 0.2974 0.3095 0.2943 0.2971 0.3167 0.2962
IHo 0 . 0 0 2 2 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0025 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0024
DAC., 0.0493 0.0469 0.0588 0.0470 0.0453 0.0570







Ln(MEo) -0.0772 -0.0715 -0.0907 -0.0715 -0.0690 -0.0873
BM0 0.3708* 0.3741* 0.3665* 0.3753* 0.3773* 0.3687*
SGo 0.0108 0.0140 0.0071 0.0132 0.0151 0.0086
AGE.! -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0050 -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0051
RANK 0.0134 0.0056 0.0313 0.0075 0.0016 0.0275
LEVo 0.5324 0.5201 0.5730 0.5150 0.5113 0.5620
R2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2
mel C: market-adjusted (equal-weighted) post-IPO one--year buy-and-hold return
Variables Coefficients
C 0.4661 0.4833 0.4661 0.4676 0.4914 0.4684
IHo 0.0017 0.0016 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0015 0.0015 0.0019
DAC.i 0.0469 0.0445 0.0566 0.0446 0.0428 0.0548
PDACo -0.6163* -0.6263* -0.5973* -0.6281* -0.6370* -0.6059*






Ln(ME0) -0.1043 -0.0991 -0.1190 -0.0986 -0.0968 -0.1156
BMo 0.3623* 0.3657* 0.3578* 0.3671* 0.3690* 0.3602*
SGo 0.0133 0.0164 0.0090 0.0155 0.0175 0.0105
AGE.! -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0048
RANK 0.0209 0.0129 0.0400 0.0149 0.0089 0.0360
LEVo 0.4698 0.4597 0.5142 0.4524 0.4510 0.5033
R2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 2.7
Robustness tests for simultaneous equations
This table reports the robustness test results of simultaneous equations. The institutional 
ownership is defined as the number of institutional owners. Panel A is for the first equation when 
the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals. Panel B is for the second equation when the 
dependent variable is the institutional ownership. DAC.i is the discretionary accruals in the pre- 
IPO year; AIHo is the change in institutional ownership between the end of the fourth quarter and 
the end of the first quarter following IPO issue date; OP.i is the operating performance in the 
pre-IPO year, which is measured by operating return on assets (ORA.i), operating cash flow 
return on assets (OCFRA.1), or return on assets (ROA.0 alternatively; Ln(TA.i) is the natural log 
of IPO firms’ total assets in the pre-IPO year; Ln(OS) is the natural log of IPO firms’ offer size;
SG.i is the sales growth in the pre-IPO year; AGE.i is the age of IPO firms in the pre-IPO year; 
RANK is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter; LEVo is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long­
term debt / total assets) in the IPO issue year; SIC is a series o f industry dummy variables based 
on IPO firms’ standard industrial classification code. *, ** represent the significance at the 5% 
and 1 0 % level respectively.
Panel A: discretionary accruals
DAC_X = C + C1A1H0 + C2OP_x + CxLn(TA_x) + C4Ln(OS) + C5SG_X + C6AGE_X + C.RANK + C%SIC + e
Variables Coefficients
c 0.851** 1.009* 0.971** 0.888** 0.998* 0.971**







Ln(TA-i) -0.081 -0.063 -0.064 -0.074 -0.058 -0.059
Ln(OS) -0.004 -0.036 -0.066 -0.010 -0.041 -0.071
SG.i -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
AGE.1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
RANK -0.086 -0.088 -0.044 -0.088 -0.089 -0.044
R2 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.71
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Table 2.7 (continued)
Panel B: institutional ownership
IH0 = C + C,DAC_{ + C2OP_t + C2Ln(TA_t ) +  C4SG_, + C,AGE_X + C6RANK + C7LEV0 + CsSIC + e
Variables Coefficients
c -17.202 -17.275 -17.141 -17.093 -17.244 -17.129







Ln(TA.i) 4.452* 4.512* 4.455* 4.448* 4.511* 4.455*
SG.i 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.028
AGE.! -0.133 -0.134 -0.131 -0.133 -0.134 -0.131
RANK 5.481* 5.441* 5.455* 5.472* 5.434* 5.453*
LEV0 -17.101 -17.351 -17.216 -17.112 -17.360 -17.220
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
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Table 2.8
Regression results for testing three hypotheses
This table reports the regression results for testing the commonly cited three hypotheses in 
explaining motives of IPO issuers. Panel A presents the results when the institutional ownership 
is defined as the number of institutional investors. Panel B presents the results when the 
institutional ownership is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutions. AIH0 is
the change in institutional ownership between the end of the fourth quarter and the end of the 
first quarter; ECR1-2 is the excess return for the 2-year period after the fourth quarter; ROAo is the 
return on assets in the IPO issue year; ROA1.2 is the average return on assets during the first and 
second year; STDois the standard deviation of stock returns from day 6  to day 255. DAC.i is the 
pre-IPO discretionary accruals; DACo is the discretionary accruals in the IPO issue year; RANK 
is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter; Ln(OS) is the natural log of IPO offer size; LEVo 
is IPO firms’ leverage ratio (long-term debt / total assets) in the IPO issue year. *, ** represent 
the significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
AIH0 = C  + CxECR{_2 + C2ROA0 + C2ROAx_2 + C4STD0 + CSDAC_X 
+ C6DAC0 + C 2RANK + Cg In (OS) + CgLEV0 + e
Panel A: institutional ownership is the number of institutional investors
Varibles Coefficients
C -48.43* -39.82* -47.77* -39.47*
ECR1.2 -1.09 -0.63 -1.26 -1.59
ROAo 0.56 3.65**
ROA !.2 -7.40 -8.61** -6.69 -4.83
STD0 397.01* 342.39* 384.57* 300.98**
DAC.i -0.99 -0.52 -0.99 -0.67
DACo -9.29* -6.29*
RANK -1.36 -1.92 -1.30 -1.47
Xn(OS) 12.66* 11.99* 12.52* 11.55*
LEVo 2.38 0.93 2.16 0.35
R2 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.21
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Table 2.8 (continued)
Panel B: institutional ownership is the percentage of shares owned by all institutions
Varibles Coefficients
C 0.112 0.144 0.097 0.144
ECR1-2 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
ROAo -0.013 -0.001
ROA j.2 -0.015 -0.019 -0.031 -0.020
STDo -1.412 -1.612 -1.130 -1.598
DAC.i -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0005
DACo -0.034** -0.035*
RANK 0.001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001
Ln(OS) -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011
LEVo 0.030 0.025 0.035 0.025
R2 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06
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